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Abstract
In the recent years, several formal approaches to the specification of norma-
tive multi-agent systems and artificial institutions have been proposed. The aim of
this paper is to advance the state of the art in this area by proposing an approach
in which a normative multi-agent system is conceived to be autonomous, in the
sense that it is able to create, maintain, and eventually change its own institutions
by itself, without the intervention of an external designer in this process. In our
approach the existence and the dynamics of an institution (norms, rules, institu-
tional facts, etc.) are determined by the (individual and collective) acceptances of
its members, and its dynamics depends on the dynamics of these acceptances.
In order to meet this objective, we propose the logic AL (Acceptance Logic)
in which the acceptance of a proposition by the agents qua members of an insti-
tution is introduced. Such propositions are true w.r.t. an institutional context and
correspond to facts that are instituted in an attitude-dependent way.
The second part of the paper is devoted to the logical characterization of some
important notions in the theory of institutions. We provide a formalization of the
concept of constitutive rule, expressed by a statement of the form “X counts as
Y in the context of institution x”. Then, we formalize the concepts of obliga-
tion and permission (so called regulative rules). In our approach constitutive rules
and regulative rules of a certain institution are attitude-dependent facts which are
grounded on the acceptances of the members of the institution.
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1 Introduction
The problem of devising artificial institutions and modeling their dynam-
ics is a fundamental problem in the multi-agent system (MAS) domain
[Dignum and Dignum, 2001]. Following [North, 1990, p. 3], artificial institutions
can be conceived as “the rules of the game in a society or the humanly devised
constraints that structure agents’ interaction”. Starting from this concept of insti-
tution, many researchers working in the field of normative MAS have been inter-
ested in developing models which describe the different kinds of rules and norms
that agents have to deal with. In some models of artificial institutions norms are
conceived as means to achieve coordination among agents and agents are supposed
to comply with them and to obey the authorities of the system [Esteva et al., 2001].
More sophisticated models of institutions leave to the agents’ autonomy the deci-
sion whether to comply or not with the specified rules and norms of the institution
[A˚gotnes et al., 2007, Lopez y Lopez et al., 2004]. However, all previous models ab-
stract away from the legislative source of the norms of an institution, and from how
institutions are created, maintained and changed by their members. More precisely,
while it is widely shared in the MAS field that, in order to face complex and dynamical
problems, individual agents must be autonomous, less emphasis is devoted to the fact
that MASs themselves for exactly the same reasons should be conceived and designed
to be autonomous. In fact, etymologically, autonomous means self-binding (‘auto’ and
‘nomos’), and an autonomous MAS should be the vision of an artificial society that is
able to create, maintain, and eventually change its own institutions by itself, without
the intervention of the external designer in this process.
The aim of this work is to advance the state of the art on artificial institutions and
normative multi-agent systems by proposing a logical model in which the existence and
the dynamics of an institution (norms, rules, institutional facts, etc.) are determined by
the individual and collective attitudes of the agents which identify themselves as mem-
bers of the institution. In particular, we propose a model in which an institution is
grounded on the (individual and collective) acceptances of its members, and its dy-
namics depends on the dynamics of these acceptances. On this aspect we agree with
[Mantzavinos et al., 2004], when the authors say that (p. 77):
“only because institutions are anchored in peoples minds do they ever be-
come behaviorally relevant. The elucidation of the internal aspect is the
crucial step in adequately explaining the emergence, evolution, and effects
of institutions.” [Emphasis added].
This relationship between acceptance and institutions has been emphasized in the
philosophical doctrine of Legal Positivism [Hart, 1992]. According to Hart, the foun-
dations of a normative system or institution consist of adherence to, or acceptance of,
an ultimate rule of recognition by which the validity of any rule of the institution may
be evaluated. 1
1In Hart’s theory, the rule of recognition is the rule which specifies the ultimate criteria of validity in a
legal system.
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Other authors working in the field of multi-agent systems have advocated the need
for a bottom up approach to the explanation of the origin and the evolution of institu-
tions. According to these authors, institutions and their dynamics should be anchored in
the agents’ attitudes [Conte et al., 1998, Boella and van der Torre, 2007]. For instance,
in agreement with Hart’s theory, [Conte et al., 1998] have stressed that the existence of
a norm in an institution (but also in a group, organization, etc.) depends on the recogni-
tion and acceptance of the norm by the members of the institution. In their perspective,
agents in a multi-agent system contribute to the enforcement and the propagation of the
norm in the social context.
The fundamental concept in our paper is that of acceptance qua member of an in-
stitution. This notion will be informally presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we will
introduce a modal logic (called AL for Acceptance Logic) which enables to reason
about acceptances of agents and groups of agents. We call the former individual ac-
ceptances, and the latter collective acceptances. In Section 4 we will study the logical
properties of the notion of acceptance and its interactions with classical notions such
that of individual (private) belief and that of mutual belief. On the basis of the concept
of acceptance qua member of an institution, we will specify how a group of agents can
create and maintain normative and institutional facts which hold only in an attitude-
dependent way. That is, it is up to the agents, and not to the external designer, to sup-
port such facts (Section 5). Then, we will distinguish regulative components and non-
regulative components of an institution [Searle, 1995] (Section 6). On the one hand,
we will formalize the concept of constitutive rule, that is, the kind of rules accepted
by the members of an institution which express classifications between different con-
cepts and establish the relations between “brute” physical facts and institutional facts
within the context of the institution (Section 6.1). Since [Searle, 1995, Searle, 1969]
and [Jones and Sergot, 1996], these rules have been expressed in terms of assertions of
the form “X counts as Y in the context of institution x” (e.g. in the institutional context
of US, a piece of paper with a certain shape, color, etc. counts as a five-dollar bill). On
the other hand, regulative rules will be formalized through a notion of obligation and
a notion of permission by studying a reduction of deontic logic to the logic of accep-
tance (Section 6.2). Section 7 will be devoted to show how the logic of acceptance
AL can be appropriately refined in order to capture some essential properties of legal
institutions in which a special kind of agents called legislators are introduced. We will
discuss some general principles which seem adequate for a formal characterization of
legal institutions. Finally, in Section 8, we will compare our proposal with related log-
ical works on institutions and normative systems. Special emphasis will be devoted to
the comparison between our approach and the modal logic of normative systems and
“counts-as” proposed by Grossi et al. [Grossi et al., 2006]. Proofs of the main theorems
presented in the paper are collected in the annex.
2 The concept of acceptance
Some conceptual clarifications of the concept of acceptance qua member of an insti-
tution are needed because of the crucial role it plays in explaining the maintenance of
social institutions.
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Several authors have emphasized the difference between acceptance and belief as
particular kinds of individual attitudes. Whereas private beliefs have been studied for
decades [Hintikka, 1962] as representative of doxastic mental states, acceptances have
only been examined since [Stalnaker, 1984] and since [Cohen, 1992]. Some authors
(e.g. [Clarke, 1994]) claim that acceptance implies belief (at least to some minimal
degree as argued in [Tollefsen, 2003]). On the contrary, in [Stalnaker, 1984] acceptance
is considered to be stronger than belief. Although belief and acceptance seem very
close, several authors [Bratman, 1992, Cohen, 1992, Tuomela, 2000] have argued for
the importance of keeping the two notions independent. We here agree with this point
of view (see Section 4.3).
For the aims of this paper we are particularly interested in a particular feature of
acceptance, namely the fact that acceptance is context-dependent (on this point see also
[Engel, 1998]). In our approach, this feature is directly encoded in the formal definition
of acceptance (see Section 3.1). In fact, one can decide (say for prudential reasons) to
reason and act by “accepting” the truth of a proposition in a specific context, and reject
the very same proposition in a different context. We will explore the role of acceptance
in institutional contexts. Institutional contexts are conceived here as rule-governed so-
cial practices on the background of which the agents reason. For example, take the
case of a game like Clue. The institutional context is the rule-governed social practice
which the agents conform to in order to be competent players. On the background of
such contexts, we are interested in the agents’ attitudes that can be formally captured.
In the context of Clue, for instance, an agent accepts that something has happened qua
player of Clue. The state of acceptance qua member of an institution is the kind of ac-
ceptance one is committed to when one is “functioning as a member of the institution”
[Tuomela, 2002, Tuomela, 2007]. In these situations it may happen that the agent’s
acceptances are in conflict with his/her beliefs. For instance, a lawyer who is trying to
defend a client in a murder case accepts qua lawyer that his/her client is innocent, even
she/he believes the contrary.
There exist others differences between belief and acceptance that are not encoded
in our formalization of acceptance. According to [Hakli, 2006], the key difference
between belief and acceptance is that the former is aimed at truth, whilst the latter
depends on an agent’s decision. More precisely, while a belief that p is an attitude con-
stitutively aimed at the truth of p, an acceptance is the output of “a decision to treat p
as true in one’s utterances and actions” without being necessarily (see [Tuomela, 2000]
for instance) connected to the actual truth of the proposition.
In the present paper the notion of acceptance qua member of an institution is also
applied to the collective level named collective acceptance. The idea of collective
attitudes is developed by Searle [Searle, 1995] among others: without supposing the
existence of any collective consciousness, he argues that attitudes can be ascribed to a
group of agents and that “the forms of collective intentionality cannot (...) be reduced
to something else” [Searle, 1995]2.
Collective attitudes such as collective acceptance have been studied in social phi-
losophy in opposition to the traditional notions of mutual belief and mutual knowl-
2A deeper discussion on this point remains out of the scope of this paper. Some interesting arguments for
collective intentionality can be found in [Tollefsen, 2002].
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edge that are very popular in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science
[Fagin et al., 1995, Lewis, 1969]. It has been stressed that, while mutual belief is
strongly linked to individual beliefs and can be reduced to them, collective attitudes
such as collective acceptance cannot be reduced to a composition of individual atti-
tudes. This aspect is particularly emphasized by Gilbert [Gilbert, 1987] who follows
Durkheim’s non-reductionist view of collective attitudes [Durkheim, 1982]. Accord-
ing to Gilbert, any proper group attitude cannot be defined only as a label on a par-
ticular configuration of individual attitudes, as mutual belief is. In [Gilbert, 1989,
Tuomela, 2007] it is suggested that a collective acceptance of a set of agents C is
based on the fact that the agents in C identify themselves as members of a certain
group, institution, team, organization, etc. and recognize each other as members of the
same group, institution, team, organization, etc. (this is the view that we adopt in our
formalization of acceptance, see Section 3). But mutual belief (and mutual knowledge)
does not entail this aspect of mutual recognition and identification with respect to the
same social context.
In accordance with [Tuomela, 2002, Tuomela, 2007], in this paper we consider col-
lective acceptance with respect to institutional contexts as an attitude that is held by a
set of agents qua members of the same institution. A collective acceptance held by
a set of agents C qua members of a certain institution x is the kind of acceptance
the agents in C are committed to when they are “functioning together as members of
the institution x”, that is, when the agents in C identify and recognize each other as
members of the institution x. For example, in the context of the institution Greenpeace
agents (collectively) accept that their mission is to protect the Earth qua members of
Greenpeace. The state of acceptance qua members of Greenpeace is the kind of accep-
tance these agents are committed to when they are functioning together as members
of Greenpeace, that is, when they identify and recognize each other as members of
Greenpeace.
3 Acceptance logic
The logic AL (Acceptance Logic) enables expressing that some agents identify them-
selves as members of a certain institution and what (groups of) agents accept while
functioning together as members of an institution. The principles of AL clarify the
relationships between individual acceptances (acceptances of individual agents) and
collective acceptances (acceptances of groups of agents).
3.1 Syntax
The syntactic primitives of AL are the following: a finite non-empty set of agents
AGT ; a countable set of atomic formulas ATM ; and a finite set of labels INST de-
noting institutions. We note 2AGT? = 2AGT \ {∅} the set of all non-empty subsets of
AGT . The language LAL of the logic AL is given by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | AC :xϕ
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where p ranges over ATM , C ranges over 2AGT? and x ranges over INST . We define
∧,→,↔ and > from ∨, ¬ and ⊥ in the usual manner.
The formulaAC :xϕ reads “the agents inC accept that ϕwhile functioning together
as members of the institution x”. For notational convenience, we write i :x instead of
{i}:x .
For example, AC :GreenpeaceprotectEarth expresses that the agents in C accept
that the mission of Greenpeace is to protect the Earth while functioning together as
activists in the context of Greenpeace; and Ai:CatholicPopeInfallibility expresses that
agent i accepts that the Pope is infallible while functioning as a member of the Catholic
Church.
The formula AC :x⊥ has to be read “agents in C are not functioning together as
members of the institution x”, because we assume that functioning as a member of an
institution is, at least in this minimal sense, a rational activity. Conversely, ¬AC :x⊥
has to be read “agents in C are functioning together as members of the institution x”.
Thus, ¬AC :x⊥∧AC :xϕ stands for “agents in C are functioning together as members
of the institution x and they accept that ϕ while functioning together as members of
x” or simply “agents in C accept that ϕ qua members of the institution x”. Therefore
¬AC :xϕ has to be read “agents in C do not accept that ϕ be true qua members of x”.
3.2 AL frames
We use a standard possible worlds semantics. Let the set of all couples of non-empty
subsets of agents and institutional contexts be
∆ = 2AGT? × INST .
A frame of the logic of acceptance AL (AL frame) is a couple
F = 〈W ,A 〉
where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• A : ∆ → W ×W maps every C :x ∈ ∆ to a relation AC :x between possible
worlds in W .
We note AC :x (w) = {w ′ : 〈w ,w ′〉 ∈ AC :x} the set of worlds that the agents in C
accept at w while functioning together as members of the institution x .
We impose the following constraints on AL frames, for any world w ∈ W , insti-
tutional context x ∈ INST , and sets of agents C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
if w ′ ∈ AB :y(w) then AC :x (w ′) ⊆ AC :x (w)(S.1)
if w ′ ∈ AB :y(w) then AC :x (w) ⊆ AC :x (w ′)(S.2)
if AC :x (w) 6= ∅ then AB :x (w) ⊆ AC :x (w)(S.3)
if w ′ ∈ AC :x (w) then w ′ ∈
⋃
i∈C
Ai:x (w ′)(S.4)
if AC :x (w) 6= ∅ then AB :x (w) 6= ∅(S.5)
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The constraint S.1 is a generalized version of transitivity: given two sets of agents
C ,B such that B ⊆ C , if w′ is a world that the agents in B accept at w while func-
tioning together as members of the institution y and w′′ is a world that the agents in C
accept at w′ while functioning together as members of the institution x then, w′′ is a
world that the agents in C accept at w while functioning together as members of the
institution x.
The constraint S.2 is a generalized version of euclideanity: given two sets of agents
C ,B such that B ⊆ C , if w′ is a world that the agents in B accept at w while func-
tioning together as members of the institution y and w′′ is a world that the agents in
C accept at w while functioning together as members of the institution x then, w′′ is a
world that the agents in C accept at w′ while functioning together as members of the
institution x.
The constraint S.3 is a property of conditional inclusion: given two sets of agents
C ,B such that B ⊆ C , if there exists a worldw′′ that the agents in C accept atw while
functioning together as members of the institution x and w′ is a world that the agents
in B accept at w while functioning together as members of the institution x then, w′ is
also a world that the agents in C accept at w while functioning together as members of
the institution x.
The constraint S.4 is a sort of weak reflexivity: if w′ is a world that the agents in C
accept atw while functioning together as members of the institution x then, there exists
some agent i ∈ C such that w′ is a world that agent i accepts at w′, while functioning
as a member of the institution x.
According to the last constraint S.5, given two sets of agents C ,B such that B ⊆
C , if there exists a world w′ that the agents in C accept at w while functioning together
as members of the institution x then, there exists a worldw′′ that the agents in B accept
at w while functioning together as members of the institution x.
3.3 AL models and validity
A model of the logic of acceptance AL (AL model) is a couple
M = 〈F ,V 〉
where:
• F is a AL frame;
• V : ATM → 2W is valuation function associating a set of possible worlds
V (p) ⊆W to each atomic formula p of ATM .
Given M = 〈W ,A ,V 〉 and w ∈ W , the couple 〈M,w〉 is a pointed AL model.
Given a formula ϕ, we writeM,w |= ϕ and say that ϕ is true at world w inM. The
notationM,w 6|= ϕ means that ϕ is false at world w inM. The truth conditions for
the formulas of the logic AL are:
• M,w 6|= ⊥;
• M,w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
• M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ;
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• M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ orM,w |= ψ;
• M,w |= AC :xϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ ∈ AC :x (w).
A formula ϕ is true in a AL modelM if and only ifM, w |= ϕ for every world w in
M. ϕ is AL valid (noted |=AL ϕ) if and only if ϕ is true in all AL models. ϕ is AL
satisfiable if and only if ¬ϕ is not AL valid.
3.4 Axiomatization
The axiomatization of AL is as follows:
All principles of propositional calculus(ProTau)
AC :x (ϕ→ ψ)→ (AC :xϕ→ AC :xψ)(K)
AC :xϕ→ AB :yAC :xϕ if B ⊆ C(PAccess)
¬AC :xϕ→ AB :y¬AC :xϕ if B ⊆ C(NAccess)
(¬AC :x⊥ ∧AC :xϕ)→ AB :xϕ if B ⊆ C(Inc)
AC :x (
∧
i∈C
Ai:xϕ→ ϕ)(Unanim)
¬AC :x⊥ → ¬AB :x⊥ if B ⊆ C(Mon)
From ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` ψ(MP)
From ` ϕ infer ` AC :xψ(Nec)
This axiomatization includes all tautologies of propositional calculus (ProTau) and
the rule of inference modus ponens (MP). Axiom K and rule of necessitation (Nec)
define a minimal normal modal logic. (See [Chellas, 1980, chap. 4].)
Axioms PAccess and NAccess express that a group of agents has always access to
what is accepted (resp. not accepted) by its supergroups.
Axiom PAccess concerns the (positive) access to what is accepted by a supergroup:
when the agents in a set C function together as members of the institution x , then for
all B ⊆ C the agents in B have access to all facts that are accepted by the agents in
C . That is, if the agents in C accept that ϕ while functioning together as members of
the institution x then, while functioning together as members of x , the agents of every
subset B of C accept that the agents in C accept that ϕ.
Axiom NAccess concerns the (negative) access to what is not accepted by a super-
group: if the agents in C do not accept that ϕ while functioning together as members
of the institution x then, while functioning together as members of x , the agents of
every subset B of C accept that the agents in C do not accept that ϕ.
Example 1. Suppose that three agents i, j, k, while functioning together as members
of the UK trade union, accept that their mission is to increase teachers’ wages, but they
do not accept qua members of the trade union that their mission is to increase railway
workers’ wages:
A{i,j,k}:Union increaseTeacherWage and ¬A{i,j,k}:Union increaseRailwayWage.
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By Axiom PAccess we infer that, while functioning as a UK citizen, i accepts that
i, j, k accept that their mission is to increase teachers’ wages, while functioning to-
gether as members of the trade union:
Ai:UKA{i,j,k}:Union increaseTeacherWage.
By Axiom NAccess we infer that, while functioning as a UK citizen, i accepts that
i, j, k do not accept, qua members of the trade union, that their mission is to increase
railway workers’ wages:
Ai:UK¬A{i,j,k}:Union increaseRailwayWage.
Axiom Inc says that, if the agents in C accept that ϕ qua members of x then for
every subset B of C the agents in B accept ϕ while functioning together as members
of x . This means that the facts accepted by the agents in C qua members of a certain
institution x are necessarily accepted by the agents in all of C ’s subsets with respect
to the same institution. Therefore Axiom Inc describes the top down process leading
from C ’s collective acceptance to the individual acceptances of the agents in C .
Example 2. Imagine three agents i, j, k that, qua players of the game Clue, accept
that someone called Mrs. Red, has been killed:
¬A{i,j,k}:Clue⊥ ∧A{i,j,k}:CluekilledMrsRed .
By Axiom Inc we infer that also the two agents i, j, while functioning as Clue players,
accept that someone called Mrs. Red has been killed:
A{i,j}:CluekilledMrsRed .
Axiom Unanim expresses a unanimity principle according to which the agents in
C , while functioning together as members of x , accept that if each of them individually
accepts that ϕ while functioning as a member of x , then ϕ is the case. This axiom de-
scribes the bottom up process leading from the individual acceptances of the members
of C to the collective acceptance of the group C .
Finally, Axiom Mon expresses an intuitive property of monotonicity about institu-
tion membership. It says that, if the agents in C are functioning together as members
of the institution x then, for every subset B of C , the agents in B are also functioning
together as members of the institution x . As emphasized in Section 2, “the agents in
C function together as members of institution x” means for us that “the agents in C
identify and recognize each other as members of the same institution x”. Thus, Axiom
Mon can be rephrased as follows: if the agents in a set C identify and recognize each
other as members of the institution x then, for every subset B of C , the agents in B
also identify and recognize each other as members of x .
The following correspondences (in the sense of correspondence theory, see for in-
stance [van Benthem, 2001, Blackburn et al., 2001]) exist between the axioms of the
logic AL and the semantic constraints over AL frames given in Section 3.2 (see also
proof of Theorem 1 in the Annex): Axiom PAccess corresponds to the constraint S.1,
NAccess corresponds to S.2, Inc corresponds to S.3, Unanim corresponds to S.4 and
Mon corresponds to S.5.
We callAL the logic axiomatized by the principles given above: ProTau, K, PAc-
cess, NAccess, Inc, Unanim, Mon, MP, Nec. We write `AL ϕ if formula ϕ is a
theorem of AL and 0AL ϕ if formula ϕ is not a theorem.
We can prove thatAL is sound and complete with respect to the class ofAL frames.
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Theorem 1. `AL ϕ if and only if |=AL ϕ.
By the standard filtration method we can also prove that the logic AL is decidable.
Theorem 2. The logic AL is decidable.
In the following section the properties of the concepts of individual acceptance,
collective acceptance and institution membership will be studied. We will also study
the relationships between acceptance and belief in a more formal way than in Section
2.
4 General properties
4.1 Properties of acceptance and institution membership
The following theorem highlights some interesting properties of collective acceptance
and institution membership.
Theorem 3. For every x, y ∈ INST and B,C ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
`AL AC :x¬AC :x⊥(3a)
`AL AC :x
∧
i∈C
¬Ai:x⊥(3b)
`AL AB :yAC :xϕ↔ AC :xϕ(3c)
`AL AB :y¬AC :xϕ↔ (AB :y⊥ ∨ ¬AC :xϕ)(3d)
`AL AC :x (AC :xϕ→ ϕ)(3e)
`AL (AC :x
∧
i∈C
Ai:xϕ)↔ AC :xϕ(3f)
Theorem 3a expresses a property of institution membership. It says that the agents
in a group C , while functioning together as members of the institution x, accept that
they are functioning together as members of the institution x. Theorem 3b is another
way to express the property of institution membership: it expresses that the agents in
a group, while functioning together as members of a certain institution, accept that
everyone of them is functioning as a member of the institution.
Example 3. Suppose that, during a concert, the agents in C are functioning together
as members of the Philharmonic Orchestra. Then, according to Theorem 3a, this fact
is accepted by the group C . That is, while functioning together as members of the
Philharmonic Orchestra, the agents in C accept that they are functioning together as
members of the Philharmonic Orchestra: AC:Orchestra¬AC:Orchestra⊥. Moreover,
they accept that everyone of them is functioning as a member of the Philharmonic
Orchestra: AC:Orchestra
∧
i∈C ¬Ai:Orchestra⊥.
Theorem 3c and Theorem 3d together express that a group of agents B can never
be wrong in ascribing a collective acceptance to its supergroup C and in recognizing
that its supergroup C does not accept something. Furthermore, a group of agents B
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has always correct access to what is accepted (resp. not accepted) by its supergroups.
The right to left direction of Theorem 3c is Axiom PAccess. The left to right direction
means that, given two sets of agentsB andC such thatB ⊆ C , if the agents inB , while
functioning together as members of institution y, accept that the agents in C accept ϕ
while functioning together as members of institution x then, the agents in C accept ϕ
while functioning together as members of institution x. The right to left direction of
Theorem 3d is Axiom NAccess. The left to right direction means that, given two sets
of agents B and C such that B ⊆ C , if the agents in B , while functioning together as
members of institution y, accept that the agents in C do not accept ϕ qua members of
institution x then, either the agents in B do not function as members of y or the agents
in C do not accept ϕ qua members of institution x.
Theorem 3e and Theorem 3f are variants of the unanimity Axiom Unanim. Theo-
rem 3e says that for every set of agents C , the agents in C , while functioning together
as members of x , accept that if they accept that ϕ while functioning together as mem-
bers of x , then ϕ is the case. Theorem 3f expresses that: if the agents in C , while
functioning together as members of x , accept that each of them individually accepts
that ϕ while functioning as a member of x , then the agents in C , while functioning
together as members of x , accept that ϕ is the case.
The following theorem highlights the relationship between the acceptance of a
group of agents and the acceptances of its subgroups.
Theorem 4. For every x ∈ INST and C1, C2, C3 ∈ 2AGT such that C3 ⊆ C2 ⊆ C1
and C3 6= ∅:
`AL AC1:x (AC2:xϕ→ AC3:xϕ)
Theorem 4 expresses that every group of agents has to accept the principle of in-
clusion formalized by Axiom Inc.
4.2 Discussion around the unanimity principle
Let us consider more in detail the unanimity property of our logic of acceptance ex-
pressed by Axiom Unanim (and Theorems 3e,3f). This property says that collective
acceptances emerge from consensus. This is for us a necessary requirement for a no-
tion of collective acceptance which is valid for all institutions and groups. We did not
include stronger principles which explain how a collective acceptance of a group of
agents C might be constructed. Nevertheless, one might go further and consider other
kinds of principles which are specific to certain institutions and groups.
For example, one might want to extend the analysis to formal (legal) institutions
in which special agents with the power to affect the acceptances of the other members
of the institution are introduced. In legal institutions, one can formalize the rule ac-
cording to which all facts that are accepted by the legislators of an institution must be
universally accepted by all members of this institution. Suppose that x denotes a legal
institution (e.g. EU, Association of Symbolic Logic, etc.) which has a non-empty set
of agents called legislators, noted Leg(x ) ∈ 2AGT?. (See Section 7 for a precise defi-
nition of the function Leg() and a more elaborate analysis of the concepts of legislator
and legal institution.) From this, one can formalize a principle stating that everything
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that the legislators of the legal institution x accept is universally accepted in the legal
institution x :
AC :x (
∧
i∈Leg(x)
Ai:xϕ→ ϕ)(Legislators)
The Principle Legislators says that, for every group of agents C , while functioning
together as members of the institution x , the agents in C accept that if the legislators
of x accept that ϕ, then ϕ is the case.
Another interesting principle for the construction of collective acceptance is ma-
jority. (In this case, unanimity is not required to obtain a consensus.) This kind of
principle applies both to informal and formal institutions. The principle of majority
could be introduced as a logical axiom for two specific sets of agents C and B such
that B ⊆ C and |C \B| < |B | (i.e. B represents the majority of agents in C):
AC :x (
∧
i∈B
Ai:xϕ→ ϕ)(Majority)
The Principle Majority says that, for every group of agents C , while functioning to-
gether as members of the institution x , the agents in C accept that if the majority of
them accept that ϕ, then ϕ is the case. The following example by Pettit [Pettit, 2001]
shows how the majority principle would work.
Example 4. Imagine a three-member court which has to make a judgment on whether
a defendant is liable (noted l) for a breach of contract. The three judges i, j and k
accept a majority rule to decide on the issue. That is, i, j and k, while functioning
together as members of the court, accept that if the majority of them accepts that the
defendant is liable (resp. not liable), then the defendant is liable (resp. not liable).
Formally, for any B such that B ⊆ {i , j , k} and |B | = 2 we have:
A{i,j ,k}:court(
∧
i∈B
Ai:courtl→ l) ∧ A{i,j ,k}:court(
∧
i∈B
Ai:court¬l→ ¬l)
Therefore, if the three judges accept that two of them accept that the defendant is liable,
i.e. A{i,j ,k}:court(Ai:courtl ∧ Aj:courtl), by the Principle Majority and Axiom K it
follows that the three judges have to accept that the judge is liable, i.e.A{i,j ,k}:courtl).
It has to be noted that the previous principle of majority cannot be generalized to
all sets of agents without incurring the following very counterintuitive consequence.
Proposition 1. If we suppose that the Principle Majority is valid for any B,C such
that B ⊆ C and |C \B| < |B | then, the following consequence is derivable, for i 6= j:
(AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ ∧ ¬AAGT :x⊥)→ AAGT :xϕ
This means that, when the majority principle is generalized to all sets of agents,
we can infer that: if all agents, qua members of institution x, accept that two of them
accept ϕ while functioning together as members of institution x then, the acceptances
of the two agents propagate to all agents in such a way that all agents accept ϕ qua
members of institution x.
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4.3 Relationships between acceptance and belief
As said in Section 2, there is a large literature about the distinction between belief
and acceptance. For us, belief and acceptance are clearly different concepts in several
senses. In this section we focus on the distinction between acceptance, individual be-
lief and mutual belief. Our aim is to provide further clarifications of the concept of
acceptance in terms of its relationships with other kinds of agents’ attitudes rather than
proposing an extension of the logic AL with individual belief and mutual belief and
studying its mathematical properties. Here, we just show how modal operators for be-
lief and mutual belief can be integrated into the logicAL on the basis of some intuitive
interaction principles relating acceptance and belief.
For convenience, we note Bel iϕ the formula that reads “the agent i believes that
ϕ is true”, and we suppose that belief operators of type Bel i are defined as usual in
a KD45 modal logic [Hintikka, 1962]. Belief operators Bel i are interpreted in terms
of accessibility relations Bi on the set of possible worlds W . These accessibility re-
lations are supposed to be serial, transitive and euclidean. We writeBi(w) for the set
{w ′ : 〈w ,w ′〉 ∈ Bi}. Bi(w) is the set of worlds that are possible according to agent
i. The truth condition is:
M,w |= Bel iϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for every w ′ ∈ Bi(w)
Moreover we introduce the notion of mutual belief which has been extensively stud-
ied both in the computer science literature [Fagin et al., 1995] and in the philosophical
literature [Lewis, 1969]. Given a set of agentsC ⊆ AGT ,MBCϕ reads “there is a mu-
tual belief in C that ϕ”, that is, “everyone in C believes that ϕ, everyone in C believes
that everyone in C believes that ϕ, everyone in C believes that everyone in C believes
that everyone in C believes that ϕ, and so on”. The mutual belief of a set of agents
C is interpreted in terms of the transitive closure B+C of the union of the accessibility
relationsBi for every agent i ∈ C , that is:
M,w |=MBCϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for every w ′ ∈ B+C (w)
Let the concept of “everybody in group C believes ϕ” be defined as follows:
ECϕ
def
=
∧
i∈C
Bel iϕ
As shown in [Fagin et al., 1995], the following axioms and rules of inference provide a
sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of individual belief and mutual belief:
All KD45-principles for the operators Bel i(KD45Bel)
` MBCϕ↔ EC(ϕ ∧MBCϕ)(FixPoint)
From ` ϕ→ EC(ϕ ∧ ψ) infer ` ϕ→MBCψ(InductionRule)
The first interesting thing to note is that, although collective acceptance and mutual
belief have different natures (see the discussion in Section 2), they share the Fix Point
property. The following Theorem 5 highlights this aspect.
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Theorem 5.
`AL AC :xϕ↔
∧
i∈C
Ai:x (ϕ ∧ AC :xϕ)
Nevertheless we cannot argue that our concept of collective acceptance is stronger
than the concept of mutual belief, in particular because the InductionRule does not
hold in AL. This is due to the non-reductionist feature of the collective acceptance: it
cannot be reduced to a particular configuration of individual acceptances.
The following two sections are devoted to discuss other interesting relations be-
tween acceptance and belief. We will first provide an analysis of the shared aspect
of collective acceptance expressed in terms of mutual belief. Then, we will briefly
consider the problem of the incompatibility between acceptance and belief.
4.3.1 The shared nature of collective acceptance
As emphasized in the philosophical literature [Gilbert, 1989, Tuomela, 1992], a collec-
tive acceptance of the agents in a set C must not be confused with (nor reduced to) the
sum of the individual acceptance of the agents in C . On the contrary, when the agents
in C accept some fact ϕ to be true qua members of a certain institution, it means that
every agent in C declares to the other agents of the group C that she/he is willing to
accept ϕ to be true. This aspect of acceptance can be formally derived by supposing
the following two principles relating individual beliefs with collective acceptances.
AC :xϕ→ Bel iAC :xϕ if i ∈ C(PIntrAccept)
¬AC :xϕ→ Bel i¬AC :xϕ if i ∈ C(NegIntrAccept)
The first principle says that: if the agents in C accept that ϕ while functioning together
as members of the institution x then, every agent in C believes this. The second prin-
ciple says that: if the agents in C do not accept ϕ qua members of x then every agent
in C believes this.
We can easily prove that, under the previous two principles, collective acceptance
is always shared so much that the group C accepts ϕ if and only if the agents in C
mutually believe this. More formally:
Proposition 2. For any C :x ∈ ∆, the following formulas are derivable from the
axiom D for belief (following from KD45Bel), Axiom FixPoint and Rule of infer-
ence InductionRule for mutual belief, and the interaction Principles PIntrAccept and
NegIntrAccept for acceptance and belief.
AC :xϕ↔MBCAC :xϕ(2a)
¬AC :xϕ↔MBC¬AC :xϕ(2b)
According to Proposition 2a, the agents in C accept that ϕ while functioning to-
gether as members of the institution x if and only if there is a mutual belief in C that
they accept that ϕ while functioning together as members of the institution x. Accord-
ing to Proposition 2b, the agents in C do not accept that ϕ qua members of x if and
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only if there is a mutual belief in C that they do not accept that ϕ qua members of x .
Hence, accepting (resp. not accepting) a proposition while functioning as members of
an institution is always a mutually believed fact (for the members of the group) which
is out in the open and that is used by all the members to reason about each other in the
institutional context.
4.3.2 Acceptance and belief might be incompatible
Individual belief and individual acceptance are both private mental attitudes but: an in-
dividual belief does not depend on context, whilst an individual acceptance is a context-
dependent attitude which is entertained by an agent qua member of a given institution.
Therefore, an agent can privately disbelieve something she/he accepts while function-
ing as a member of a given institution. Formally: Bel iϕ ∧ Ai:x¬ϕ may be true. In
a similar way, as emphasized in [Tuomela, 1992], a collective acceptance that ϕ by a
group of agents C (qua members of a given institution) might be compatible with the
fact that none of the agents inC believes that ϕ (and even that every agent inC believes
that ¬ϕ). The following example, inspired by [Tuomela, 1992, p. 285], illustrates this
point.
Example 5. At the end of the 80s, the Communist Party of Ruritania accepted that
capitalist countries will soon perish (but none of its members really believed so).
This means that the agents in C accept that capitalist countries will perish (ccwp)
qua members of the Communist Party of Ruritania (CPR) but nobody in C (privately)
believes this. Thus, formally: ¬AC:CPR⊥ ∧AC:CPRccwp ∧
∧
i∈C ¬Bel iccwp.
In the following Section 5 we will show how institutional facts can be grounded
on agents’ acceptances in such a way that the existence of the former depends on the
latter.
5 Truth in an institutional context
Recent theories of institutions [Lagerspetz, 2006, Searle, 1995, Tuomela, 2002] share
at least the following two theses.
Performativity: the acceptance that a certain fact is true shared by the members of a
certain institution may contribute to the truth of this fact within the context of
the institution.
Reflexivity: if a certain fact is true within the context of a certain institution, the ac-
ceptance of this fact by the members of the institution is present.
More precisely, a certain fact ϕ is true within the context of an institution x if and only
if the fact ϕ is accepted to be true by the members of the institution x. Therefore,
a necessary condition for the existence of a fact within the context of an institution
is that this fact is accepted to exist by the members of the institution. Moreover, the
acceptance of a certain fact by the members of an institution is a sufficient condition
for the existence of this fact within the context of the institution.
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Example 6. If the agents, qua European citizens, accept a certain piece of paper with
a certain shape, color, etc. as money, then, within the context of EU, this piece of paper
is money (performativity). At the same time, if it is true that a certain piece of paper is
money within the context of EU, then the agents qua European citizens accept the piece
of paper as money (reflexivity).
Our aim here is to represent in AL those facts that are true within the context of an
institution, that is, to define the concept of truth with respect to an institutional context
(institutional truth) in a way that respects the previous two principles of reflexivity and
performativity. We formalize the notion of institutional truth by means of the operator
[x]. A formula [x]ϕ is read “within the institutional context x, it is the case that ϕ”. We
take the latter to be synonymous of “for every set of agents C , the agents in C accept
that ϕ while functioning together as members of the institution x”. Formally, for every
x ∈ INST :
[x]ϕ
def
=
∧
C∈2AGT?
AC :xϕ
According to our definition, a fact ϕ is true within the context of institution x if and
only if, for every group C , the agents in C accept ϕ, while functioning together as
members of x . Hence the performativity and the reflexivity principles mentioned above
are guaranteed.
It is worth noting that this formal definition of truth with respect to an institution is
perfectly adequate to characterize informal institutions in which there are no special-
ized agents called legislators empowered to change the institution itself on behalf of
everybody else. It is a peculiar property of informal institutions the fact that they are
based on the general consensus of all their members [Coleman, 1990], that is, a certain
fact ϕ is true within the context of an informal institution x if and only if all members
of x accept ϕ to be true. In Section 7 we will show how the operator [x] can be appro-
priately redefined in order to characterize formal (legal) institution and to distinguish
them from informal institutions. For the moment, we just suppose that our model only
applies to the basic informal institutions of a society in which no legislator is given.
It is straightforward to prove that [x] is a normal modal operator satisfying Axiom
K and the necessitation rule.
Theorem 6. For every x ∈ INST :
`AL [x] (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([x]ϕ→ [x]ψ)(6a)
From `AL ϕ infer `AL [x]ϕ(6b)
Nevertheless, institutional operators of type [x] fail to satisfy Axiom 4 and Axiom
5. That is, [x]ϕ ∧ ¬ [x] [x]ϕ and ¬ [x]ϕ ∧ ¬ [x]¬ [x]ϕ are satisfiable in the logic AL
for any x ∈ INST . This means that for every institution x, the members of x might
accept ϕ while they do not accept that they accept ϕ and, it might be the case that the
members of x do not accept ϕ, while they do not accept that they do not accept ϕ. The
operator [x] does to satisfy these two properties because of the restriction imposed on
Axioms PAccess and NAccess according to which, the agents in a group B have access
to all facts accepted (resp. not accepted) by the agents in another group C , only if B is
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a subgroup of C . Therefore, in the logic AL, a certain fact ϕ might be accepted by all
groups of members of a certain institution x, while some group of members of x does
not have access to the fact that all groups of members of x accept ϕ. (See Section 8.1
for a discussion about a different point of view.)
The following operator [Univ ] is defined in order to express facts which are true in
all institutions:
[Univ ]ϕ
def
=
∧
x∈INST
[x]ϕ
where [Univ ]ϕ is meant to stand for “ϕ is universally accepted as true”. The operator
[Univ ] is also a normal modal operator satisfying Axiom K and the necessitation rule:
Theorem 7.
`AL [Univ ] (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([Univ ]ϕ→ [Univ ]ψ)(7a)
From `AL ϕ infer `AL [Univ ]ϕ(7b)
The operator [Univ ] too fails to satisfy Axiom 4 and Axiom 5. Indeed, [Univ ]ϕ ∧
¬ [Univ ] [Univ ]ϕ and ¬ [Univ ]ϕ ∧ ¬ [Univ ]¬ [Univ ]ϕ are satisfiable in the logic
AL. This means that: ϕ might be universally accepted, while it is not universally
accepted that ϕ is universally accepted and; it might be the case that ϕ is not universally
accepted, while it is not universally accepted that ϕ is not universally accepted.
In the following section operators of institutional truth of type [x] and the operator
of universal truth [Univ ] will be used to define the concepts of constitutive rule and
regulative rule. These two concepts are indeed fundamental for a theory of institutions.
6 Constitutive rules and regulative rules
According to many philosophers [Rawls, 1955, Alchourro´n and Bulygin, 1971] work-
ing on social theory and researchers in the field of normative multi-agent systems
[Boella and van der Torre, 2004b], institutions are based both on regulative and non-
regulative components. In particular, institutions are not only defined in terms of sets
of permissions, obligations, and prohibitions (i.e. norms of conduct [Bulygin, 1992])
but also in terms of rules which specify and create new forms of behavior and con-
cepts. Several terms such as constitutive rule [Searle, 1969, Searle, 1995], concep-
tual rule [Bulygin, 1992] or determinative rule [Von Wright, 1963] have been used
to identify this non-regulative dimension of institutions. According to Searle for in-
stance “(...) regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms
of behavior (...). But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or de-
fine new forms of behavior” [Searle, 1969, p. 33]. In Searle’s theory of institutions
[Searle, 1969, Searle, 1995], constitutive (i.e. non-regulative) rules are expressed by
means of “counts-as” statements of the form “X counts as Y in context x” where the
context x refers to the institution/normative system in which the rule is specified. As
emphasized in [Grossi et al., 2006], “counts-as” statements are used to express classi-
fications and subsumption relations between different concepts, that is, they assert just
that a concept X is a subconcept of a concept Y. These classifications are fundamen-
tal for establishing the relations between “brute” physical facts and objects on the one
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hand, and institutional facts and objects on the other hand (e.g. money, private property,
etc.). For example, in the institutional context of Europe, a piece of paper with a certain
shape, color, etc. (a physical object) counts as a five-euro bill (an institutional object).
6.1 Constitutive rules
From the concept of institutional truth presented above, a notion of constitutive rule
of the form “ϕ counts as ψ in the institutional context x” can be defined in the logic
AL. We conceive a constitutive rule as a material implication of the form ϕ → ψ in
the scope of an operator [x]. Thus, “ϕ counts as ψ in the institutional context x” only
if every group of members of institution x accepts that ϕ entails ψ. Furthermore, we
suppose that a constitutive rule is intrinsically contextual, which means that the rule is
not universally valid while it is accepted by the members of a certain institution. More
precisely, we exclude situations in which [Univ ] (ϕ → ψ) is true (i.e. situations in
which it is universally accepted that ϕ entails ψ).
In this perspective, “counts-as” statements with respect to a certain institutional
context x do not just express that the members of institution x classify ϕ as ψ in virtue
of their acceptances, but also that this classification is proper to the institution, i.e. it is
not universally accepted that ϕ entails ψ. (See [Grossi et al., 2006] for a similar per-
spective.) In this sense, the notion of “counts-as” presented here is aimed at capturing
the proper meaning of the term “constitutive rule”, that is, a rule which constitutes
something new within the context of an institution.
Thus, for every x ∈ INST the following abbreviation is given:
ϕ
x
B ψ def= [x] (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ→ ψ)
where ϕ
x
B ψ stands for “ϕ counts as ψ in the institutional context x”.
Example 7. Let consider the institutional context of gestural language. There exists a
constitutive rule in this language according to which, the nodding gesture counts as an
endorsement of what the speaker is suggesting, i.e. nodding
gesture
B yes . This means
that every group of speakers using gestural language accepts that making the nodding
gesture entails endorsing what the speaker is suggesting, i.e. [gesture] (nodding →
yes), and there are members of other institutions (e.g. different cultural contexts in
which the same gesture does not express the same fact) who do not accept this, i.e.
¬ [Univ ] (nodding → yes).
Note that a stronger version of the concept of constitutive rule could be given by
supposing that “ϕ counts as ψ in the institutional context x” if and only if ϕ en-
tails ψ within the institutional context x, i.e. [x] (ϕ → ψ), and for every institution
y, if y 6= x then it is not the case that ϕ entails ψ within the institutional con-
text y, i.e.
∧
y∈INST ,y 6=x ¬ [y] (ϕ → ψ). The latter condition implies the condition
¬ [Univ ] (ϕ→ ψ) in the definition of the “counts-as” conditionalϕ xB ψ. This stronger
version of the concept of constitutive rule is not analyzed in the present paper.
The following two theorems highlight some valid and invalid properties of “counts-
as” operators of the form
x
B. Similar properties of “counts-as” have been isolated in
[Jones and Sergot, 1996] and [Grossi et al., 2006].
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The invalidities 8a-8e show that operators
x
B do not satisfy reflexivity (invalidity
8a), transitivity (invalidity 8b), strengthening of the antecedent (invalidity 8c), weak-
ening of the consequent (invalidity 8d) and cautious monotonicity (invalidity 8e).
On the contrary, operators
x
B satisfy the properties of right logical equivalence (The-
orem 9a), left logical equivalence (Theorem 9b), conjunction of the consequents (Theo-
rem 9c), disjunction of the antecedents (Theorem 9d), cumulative transitivity (Theorem
9e).
Theorem 8.
0AL ϕ
x
B ϕ(8a)
0AL ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2
x
B ϕ3))→ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3)(8b)
0AL (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)→ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3)
x
B ϕ2)(8c)
0AL (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)→ (ϕ1
x
B (ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3))(8d)
0AL ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3))→ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
x
B ϕ3)(8e)
Theorem 9. For every x ∈ INST :
From `AL (ϕ2 ↔ ϕ3) infer `AL (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)↔ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3)(9a)
From `AL (ϕ1 ↔ ϕ3) infer `AL (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)↔ (ϕ3
x
B ϕ2)(9b)
`AL ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3))→ (ϕ1
x
B (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3))(9c)
`AL ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ3
x
B ϕ2))→ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ3)
x
B ϕ2)(9d)
`AL ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
x
B ϕ3))→ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3)(9e)
The invalidities 8a-8e are due to the local nature of the “counts-as” conditional
ϕ
x
B ψ. For instance, the fact that ϕ1
x
B ϕ2 and ϕ2
x
B ϕ3 are constitutive rules of the
institution x does not necessarily entail that ϕ1
x
B ϕ3 is a constitutive rule of x since
it does not necessarily entail ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3). This is the reason why
x
B fails to
satisfy transitivity.
Example 8. In the US state of Texas, “to commit a murder counts as to be punishable
by the Death Penalty”, and “to be punishable by the Death Penalty counts as to be li-
able to indictment”. As the Death Penalty is not universally accepted in all institutions,
both these rules are constitutive rules of Texas, i.e. murder
Texas
B DeathPenalty and
DeathPenalty
Texas
B indictable . From this, it does not follow that it is a constitutive
rule of Texas that “to commit a murder counts as to be liable to indictment”. Indeed,
¬(murder TexasB indictable) is true. This is due to the fact that “to commit a mur-
der counts as to be liable to indictment” in all countries and institutions, and it is not
constitutive of Texas, i.e. [Univ ] (murder → indictable).
Similarly,
x
B fails to satisfy reflexivity. Indeed, all agents in all possible institutions
accept the tautology ϕ → ϕ so that “ϕ counts as ϕ” cannot be intrinsically contextual
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with respect to a certain institution. For similar reasons, strengthening of the antecedent
is not a valid property of the operator
x
B.3 The following example clarifies this aspect.
Example 9. It is an accepted custom in the US that a person must leave a tip to the
waiter that served him/her at a restaurant. That is, it is a constitutive rule of US that
“not leaving a tip to the waiter counts as a violation”, i.e. ¬leaveTip USB viol . From
this, it does not follow that it is a constitutive rule of US that “not leaving a tip to
the waiter and not paying the bill counts as a violation”. Indeed, ¬((¬leaveTip ∧
¬payBill) USB viol) is true. This is because “not leaving a tip and not paying the bill
counts as a violation” in all countries and institutions, and it is not constitutive of US,
i.e. [Univ ] ((¬leaveTip ∧ ¬payBill)→ viol).
Discussion
The formal analysis of “counts-as” presented in this section is in agreement with the
formal analysis of “counts-as” proposed in [Grossi et al., 2006], where a notion of
proper classificatory rule is introduced. A proper classificatory rule is represented
by the construction ϕ ⇒cl+x ψ which is meant to stand for “ϕ counts as ψ in the nor-
mative system x”. Proper classificatory rules are distinguished by Grossi et al. from
(non-proper) classificatory rules of type ϕ ⇒clx ψ. In a way similar to our concept
of constitutive rule, proper classificatory rules have the specific property of not being
universally valid (i.e. valid in all institutional contexts). That is, differently from non-
proper classificatory rules, proper classificatory rules are rules which would not hold
without the normative system/institution stating them.4
Non-proper classificatory rules could be expressed in our logical framework by
constructions of the form [x] (ϕ → ψ), that is, by removing the condition ¬ [Univ ]
(ϕ → ψ) from the definition of ϕ xB ψ. In agreement with Grossi et al., we would
be able to prove that, differently from constitutive rules of the form ϕ
x
B ψ, such a
kind of rules satisfy reflexivity, transitivity, strengthening of the antecedent, weakening
of the consequent, and cautious monotonicity. Indeed, the following formulas are all
theorems of our logic AL:
Theorem 10.
`AL [x] (ϕ→ ϕ)(10a)
`AL ([x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ [x] (ϕ2 → ϕ3))→ [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)(10b)
`AL [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ [x] ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ3)→ ϕ2)(10c)
`AL [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2)→ [x] (ϕ1 → (ϕ2 ∨ ϕ3))(10d)
`AL ([x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3))→ [x] ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ ϕ3)(10e)
In Section 8.1 a more elaborate and detailed analysis of the logic presented in
[Grossi et al., 2006] will be provided and its formal relationships with our logic of
acceptance will be studied.
3Other authors have defended the idea that strengthening of the antecedent and transitivity should not be
valid properties of “counts-as” conditionals (e.g. [Gelati et al., 2004]).
4See [Grossi et al., 2008] for a refinement of this typology of rules.
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Another important aspect to be discussed about our formalization of “counts-as”
is the problem of contraposition. Indeed, at the present stage, ϕ
x
B ψ is logically
equivalent to ¬ψ xB ¬ϕ which can be counterintuitive in some situations. However, the
problem of contraposition could be solved by distinguishing in the language of the logic
AL formulas denoting “brute” physical facts from formulas denoting institutional facts
and by imposing that the consequent ψ of a “counts-as” conditional ϕ
x
B ψ is always
a formula denoting an institutional fact. Under this assumption, if the negation of the
antecedent in the “counts-as” conditional is not an institutional fact (i.e. formula ¬ϕ
does not denote an institutional fact), contraposition is not allowed. That is, ϕ
x
B ψ
does not imply ¬ψ xB ¬ϕ.5 It is worth noting that, this distinction between formulas
denoting “brute” physical facts and formulas denoting institutional facts would enable
us to account for an aspect of “counts-as” that our current formalization is not able to
capture, namely: the function of “counts-as” statements of establishing the relations
between physical facts and objects on the one hand (the antecedent of the “counts-as”),
and institutional facts and objects on the other hand (the consequent of the “counts-as”),
e.g. a certain piece of paper counts as a five-euro bill.
6.2 Regulative rules
Constitutive rules as defined in the previous Section 6.1 are still not sufficient for a
characterization of institutional reality. An institution is indeed connected to a deon-
tic dimension that up to now is still missing in our analysis. This deontic dimension
consists in several concepts such as obligation, permission, prohibition, etc. which are
aimed at regulating agents’ behaviors and social interactions within the context of the
institution.
In order to capture this deontic dimension of institutions, our logic AL can be
appropriately extended by introducing a violation atom viol as in Anderson’s reduc-
tion of deontic logic to alethic logic [Anderson, 1958] and in dynamic deontic logic
[Meyer, 1988]. A similar approach has been recently taken in [Grossi, 2008]. By
means of the new formal construct viol we can specify the concepts of obligation and
that of permission in a way that respects their being also a kind of attitude-dependent
facts holding in a specific institutional context.
As far as obligations are concerned, we introduce operators of the form Ox which
are used to specify what is obligatory in the context of a certain institution x:
Oxϕ
def
= ¬ϕ xB viol
According to this definition, “ϕ is obligatory within the institutional context x” if and
only if “¬ϕ counts as a violation within the institutional context x”.
Example 10. The formula (driveCar ∧ RightSide) UKB viol which is equivalent to
OUK (driveCar → ¬RightSide) expresses that in the UK it is obligatory to drive on
5See also [Grossi, 2008] for a different solution on how to solve the problem of contraposition in a normal
modal logic of “counts-as”.
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the left side of the street (i.e. “driving a car on the right side of the street counts as
violation in UK”).
As the following theorem highlights, our Ox operators satisfy axiom K (Theorem
11a) and do not allow obligations about tautologies (Theorem 11b).
Theorem 11. For every x ∈ INST :
`AL Ox(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Oxϕ→ Oxψ)(11a)
`AL ¬Ox>(11b)
On the contrary, obligation operators do not satisfy the necessitation rule. This is
due to the negative condition ¬ [Univ ] (¬ϕ → viol) in the definition of Oxϕ. Indeed,
in order to have a normal modal operator for obligation, it is sufficient to remove the
negative condition ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ → ψ) from the definition of the “counts-as” condi-
tional ϕ
x
B ψ given in Section 6.1. The following theorem highlights other interesting
invalidities of the obligation operators Ox.
Theorem 12.
0AL ¬Ox⊥(12a)
0AL Oxϕ→ Ox(ϕ ∨ ψ)(12b)
0AL Ox(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Oxϕ(12c)
According to the invalidity 12a, obligation operators do not satisfy the axiom D
of Standard Deontic Logic (SDL) [A˚qvist, 2002]. For instance, in the logic AL in-
stitutions might be empty, that is, for every C ∈ 2AGT?, AC :x⊥. If institution x
is empty, it does not have any obligation (i.e. Ox⊥). According to the other two in-
validities we have that: if ϕ is obligatory within the context of institution x then, it
is not necessarily the case that ϕ or ψ is obligatory within the context of the same
institution (invalidity 12b) and if ϕ and ψ are obligatory within the context of insti-
tution x then, it is not necessarily the case that ϕ is obligatory within the context of
the same institution (invalidity 12c). Thus, our obligation operators Ox do not in-
cur two classical problems of Standard Deontic Logic which are commonly referred
to as “Ross paradox” and “Good Samaritan paradox” [Carmo and Jones, 2002]. On
the one hand, it seems rather odd to say that the obligation to mail a certain letter
entails an obligation to mail the letter or to burn it which can be fulfilled simply
by burning the letter (something presumably forbidden) (“Ross paradox”). On the
other hand, it seems rather odd to say that if it is obligatory that Mary helps John
who has had an accident, then it is obligatory that John has an accident (“Good
Samaritan paradox”). Here we do not consider other well-known paradoxes of deontic
logic (such as Chisholm paradox for instance) which require an elaborate and detailed
analysis of contrary-to-duty obligations and defeasible conditional obligations (on this
see [Prakken and Sergot, 1997, Makinson, 1993, Hansen et al., 2007] for instance). In-
deed, this issue goes beyond the objectives of the present work.
As far as permissions are concerned we say that “ϕ is permitted within the institu-
tional context x” (noted Pxϕ) if and only if ¬ϕ is not obligatory within the institutional
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context x. Formally:
Pxϕ
def
= ¬Ox¬ϕ
That is, we define the permission operator in the standard way as the dual of the obli-
gation operator.6
Before concluding this section, it is important to stress again that in our approach
regulative rules of type Oxϕ and Pxϕ as well as constitutive rules of type ϕ
x
B ψ of a
certain institution are attitude-dependent facts which are grounded on the acceptances
of the members of a certain institution.
7 Towards legal institutions
In Section 5 we have supposed that ϕ is true within the context of institution x if and
only if all members of this institution accept ϕ to be true. At this point, it might be
objected that there are facts which are true in an institutional context but only “special”
members of the institution are aware of them. For instance, there are laws in every
country that are known only by the specialists of the domain (lawyers, judges, members
of the Parliament, etc.). Aren’t these facts true notwithstanding that many members of
the institution are not aware of them?
In order to resist to this objection recall that until now our model applied to
the basic informal institutions of a society, that is, rule-governed social practices
[Tuomela, 2002] in which no member with “special” powers is introduced.
It is a peculiar property of informal institutions to be based on general consen-
sus [Coleman, 1990], that is, a certain fact ϕ is true within the context of an informal
institution x if and only if all members of x accept ϕ to be true. Relative to this restric-
tion, the assumption made in Section 5 is justified because, with respect to informal
institutions, there are no specialized agents called legislators empowered to change the
institution itself on behalf of everybody else. For instance, in the informal institution
of common language, nobody has the power to change the rules for promising. (See
[Searle, 1969] for more details.) On the contrary, it is a specificity of legal (formal)
institutions to have such specialized agents with special powers to interpret and mod-
ify the institution itself. This distinction between informal and formal (legal) institu-
tions has been stressed by many authors working in the field of social and legal theory
[Castelfranchi, 2003, North, 1990, Lorini and Longin, 2008, Von Wright, 1963]. Con-
sider for instance the following quotation from Von Wright where the terms prescrip-
tion and custom respectively correspond to the terms formal institution and informal
institution used here: “(...) Prescriptions are given or issued by someone. They ‘flow’
from or have their ‘source’ in the will of norm-giver (...) Customs, first of all, are not
given by any authority to subjects. If we can speak of an authority behind the customs
at all this authority would be the community itself” [Von Wright, 1963, p. 7–9].
6We do not consider here the classical distinction between weak permission and strong permission
[Alchourro´n and Bulygin, 1971, Raz, 1975, Von Wright, 1963]. According to legal theory, a weak permis-
sion corresponds to the absence in a normative system of a norm prohibiting ϕ (this is represented by our
permission operator Px). A strong permission corresponds to the existence in the normative system of an
explicit norm, issued by the legislators, according to which ϕ is permitted. For a logical analysis of the
distinction between weak and strong permission see our related work [Lorini and Longin, 2008].
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In the rest of this section we will show how the logic AL can be appropriately
refined in order to move beyond informal institutions and to capture some essential
properties of formal (legal) institutions in which legislators are introduced. We will
discuss some general principles which seem adequate for a formal characterization
of legal institutions. For the sake of simplicity and readability of the article, these
principles will not be included in the axiomatization of the logicAL and their semantic
counterparts will not be studied.
In order to distinguish formal from informal institutions, we introduce a total func-
tion Leg which assigns a (possibly empty) set of agents to every institution x:
Leg : INST −→ 2AGT
Leg(x) denotes the set of legislators of institution x, that is, the set of agents legally
responsible over institution x and which are entitled to modify its structure. The func-
tion Leg allows distinguishing formal from informal institutions in a simple way. It is
indeed reasonable to suppose that informal institutions are those institutions that do not
have legislators, that is, x is an informal institution if and only if Leg(x) = ∅. On the
contrary, if Leg(x) 6= ∅, x is a legal or formal institution. In this sense, the cardinality
of Leg(x) provides an important property: it allows us to distinguish between legal
institutions and informal institutions.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the legislators of a certain legal institution x
must function together as members of institution x. This assumption is expressed by
the following principle. For any x ∈ INST such that Leg(x) 6= ∅:
¬ALeg(x):x⊥
As emphasized in Section 5, legislators are “special” agents who have the power to
affect the acceptances of the other members of the institution. In legal institutions, all
facts that are accepted by the legislators must be universally accepted by all members
of the institution. In this perspective, legal institutions are characterized by the follow-
ing principle which explains how the collective acceptance of a set C of members of
institution x is affected by the acceptance of the legislators of the institution. For every
C ∈ 2AGT? and x ∈ INST such that Leg(x) 6= ∅:
AC :x (
∧
i∈Leg(x)
Ai:xϕ→ ϕ)(Legislators)
According to Legislators, for every group of agents C , while functioning together as
members of the institution x , the agents in C accept that if the legislators of x accept
that ϕ, then ϕ is the case. As emphasized in Section 4.1, the Principle Legislators can
be conceived as an additional specification of how collective acceptances of groups of
agents are built within the context of an institution. It is worth noting that Legislators is
perfectly compatible with the general principle of unanimity of the logicAL described
by Axiom Unanim (and the related Theorems 3e, 3f). Indeed, we can reasonably
suppose that the members of an institution might accept certain things on the basis of
a criterion of unanimity and, at the same time, accept what the legislators accept and
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decide.7
We conclude by showing how the concept of institutional truth proposed in Sec-
tion 5 can be appropriately refined in order to deal with legal institutions. Differently
from informal institutions, legal institutions do not necessarily depend on the general
consensus of all their members. More precisely, if a certain fact ϕ is true within the
context of the legal institution x then, it is not necessarily the case that for every set
of agents C , the agents in C accept ϕ while functioning together as members of the
legal institution x. In a legal institution it is sufficient that the legislators accept ϕ to
be true to make it true for the institution. This means that the notion of institutional
truth for legal institutions should be defined as follows. For any x ∈ INST such that
Leg(x) 6= ∅:
[x]L ϕ
def
= ALeg(x):xϕ
This means that “within the context of the legal institution x it is the case that ϕ” if and
only if “the legislators of institution x accept that ϕ”.
From the principles of AL and the definition of the function Leg(), it follows that
the operators [x]L are also normal. Moreover, differently from the [x] operators, which
adequately characterize the notion of institutional truth for informal institutions, [x]L
operators satisfy axioms 4 and 5 of modal logic, that is: if the legislators of institution
x accept ϕ then, they accept that they accept ϕ (Theorem 13c); if the legislators of
an institution x do not accept ϕ, then they accept that they do not accept ϕ (Theorem
13d).8
Theorem 13. For every x ∈ INST :
`AL [x]L (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([x]L ϕ→ [x]L ψ)(13a)
From `AL ϕ infer `AL [x]L ϕ(13b)
`AL [x]L ϕ→ [x]L [x]L ϕ(13c)
`AL ¬ [x]L ϕ→ [x]L ¬ [x]L ϕ(13d)
It is worth noting that the analysis of constitutive rules and regulative rules proposed
in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 could be refined in the light of this distinction between informal
and legal institutions. In particular, a new form of “counts-as” and two related concepts
of obligation and permission could be defined in terms of the previous operator [x]L.
This is in order to characterize a notion of constitutive rule and a notion of regulative
rule which apply straightforwardly to the context of legal institutions, and which go
beyond the notions of constitutive rule and regulative rule for informal institutions
given in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 and based on the operator [x]. We postpone this kind of
analysis to future works.
7Note that a further principle which seems reasonable for legal institutions is a majority principle for
legislators: the legislators of a certain legal institution x accept that if the majority of them accept ϕ, then
ϕ is true. This should be conceived as a particular case of the majority principle discussed in Section 4.1.
Formally, for any x ∈ INST such that Leg(x) 6= ∅, if B ⊆ Leg(x) and |Leg(x) \ B | < |B | (i.e. B
represents the majority of the legislators of the institution x ) then: ALeg(x):x (
∧
i∈B Ai:xϕ→ ϕ).
8Note that the operator [x] is stronger than the operator [x]L, that is, [x]ϕ implies [x]L ϕ.
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8 Comparison with other logical approaches to norma-
tive systems
In the following two sections our logic AL will be compared with two approaches to
normative systems and institutions which have been recently proposed in the multi-
agent system domain.
8.1 Embedding Grossi et al.’s logic of “counts-as” into AL
Because of the interesting formal similarities, we will first compareALwith the modal
logic of normative systems proposed in [Grossi et al., 2006], henceforth abbreviated
GMD logic.
In the GMD logic a set of contexts CXT denoting normative systems is intro-
duced. GMD logic is based on a set of modal operators [[x]] (one for every context
x in CXT ). Operators [[x]] are similar to our operators [x] defined in Section 5.9 A
formula [[x]]ϕ approximately stands for “in the institutional context/normative system
x it is the case that ϕ”. It is supposed that CXT contains a special context Univ ,
where the operator [[Univ ]] is used for denoting facts which universally hold. We note
CXT 0 = CXT \ {Univ}. The language of the GMD logic is given by the following
BNF:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | [[x]]ϕ
where p ranges over ATM and x ranges over CXT . ∧,→,↔ and > are defined from
∨, ¬ and ⊥ in the usual manner.
As noted in Section 6.1, operators [[x]] and [[Univ ]] are exploited in Grossi et al.’s
logic to define contextual conditionals called proper classificatory rules, noted ϕ⇒cl+x
ψ, which are an abbreviation of [[x]] (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ [[Univ ]] (ϕ→ ψ) and which read “ϕ
counts as ψ in the normative system x”. The construction ϕ ⇒cl+x ψ is similar to our
ϕ
x
B ψ.
The most striking difference between our logic of acceptance AL and the GMD
logic is that in the logic AL the contextual operators [x] are built on the notion of
collective acceptance, whereas in the GMD logic the contextual operators [[x]] are
given as primitive operators.
Frames of the GMD logic are called multi-context frames. A multi-context frame
has the following form:
FGMD = 〈S , {Sx}x∈CXT0〉
where:
• S is a set of possible worlds;
• {Sx}x∈CXT0 is a family of subsets of S , one for every institutional context x ∈
CXT 0.
A multi-context model is a tuple
MGMD = 〈FGMD, pi〉
where:
9Here we use the notation [[x]] in order to distinguish their operators from ours.
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• FGMD is a multi-context frame;
• pi : ATM → 2S is a valuation function associating a set of possible worlds
pi(p) ⊆ S to each atomic formula p of ATM .
The truth conditions for formulas of the GMD logic are just standard for con-
tradiction, atomic propositions, negation and disjunction. The following are the truth
conditions for [[x ]]ϕ and [[Univ ]]ϕ.
• MGMD,w |= [[x ]]ϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ ∈ Sx;
• MGMD,w |= [[Univ ]]ϕ iff M,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ ∈ S .
A formula ϕ is true in a GMD modelMGMD iffMGMD, w |= ϕ for every world w
inMGMD. ϕ is GMD valid (noted |=GMD ϕ) if and only if ϕ is true in all GMD
models. ϕ is GMD satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not GMD valid.
The GMD logic is axiomatized by the following principles, where x and y denote
elements of the set CXT 0 :
All principles of propositional calculus(ProTau)
[[x]] (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([[x]]ϕ→ [[x]]ψ)(K[[x]])
[[Univ ]] (ϕ→ ψ)→ ([[Univ ]]ϕ→ [[Univ ]]ψ)(K[[Univ ]])
[[x]]ϕ→ [[y]] [[x]]ϕ(4[[x]],[[y]])
¬ [[x]]ϕ→ [[y]]¬ [[x]]ϕ(5[[x]],[[y]])
[[Univ ]]ϕ→ [[Univ ]] [[Univ ]]ϕ(4[[Univ ]])
¬ [[Univ ]]ϕ→ [[Univ ]]¬ [[Univ ]]ϕ(5[[Univ ]])
[[Univ ]]ϕ→ ϕ(T[[Univ ]])
[[Univ ]]ϕ→ [[x]]ϕ(⊆[[Univ ]],[[x]])
From ` ϕ and ` ϕ→ ψ infer ` ψ(MP)
From ` ϕ infer ` [[x]]ψ(Nec[[x]])
From ` ϕ infer ` [[Univ ]]ψ(Nec[[Univ ]])
We write `GMD ϕ if formula ϕ is a theorem of GMD.
Axiom K[[x]] and Rule Nec[[x]] express that the operators [[x]] are normal modal oper-
ators. Axioms K[[Univ ]], 4[[Univ ]], 5[[Univ ]], T[[Univ ]] and the rule of inference Nec[[Univ ]]
express that the universal modality [[Univ ]] is defined in the modal logic system S5.
According to the Axioms 4[[x]],[[y]] and 5[[x]],[[y]], truth and falsehood in institutional con-
texts/normative systems are absolute because they remain invariant even if they are
evaluated from another institutional context/normative system. This means that every
normative system y has full access to all facts which are true in a different normative
system x. In our view, these two principles are criticizable because they rely on a
strong assumption of perfect information, i.e. a normative system has perfect informa-
tion about the facts that are true in the other normative systems. Axiom ⊆[[Univ ]],[[x]]
expresses the relationship between the universal modality and the contextual modali-
ties.
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In [Grossi, 2007] it is proved that the GMD logic is sound and complete with
respect to the class of GMD frames.
It is easy to show that the principles of the acceptance logic AL given in Section
3 are not sufficient to derive the principles of the GMD logic. In particular, Axioms
4[[x]],[[y]], 5[[x]],[[y]], 4[[Univ ]], 5[[Univ ]] and T[[Univ ]] are not derivable in AL.
In order to embed GMD we need to slightly modify the properties of the logicAL.
On the one hand, we need to generalize Axioms PAccess and NAccess by supposing
that they also hold for the case B 6⊆ C. This is in order to infer the formulas [x]ϕ →
[y] [x]ϕ and ¬ [x]ϕ → [y]¬ [x]ϕ in the augmented logic AL. Thus, we need to
assume that, given two arbitrary sets of agents B and C , the agents in B have access
to all facts that the agents in C accept (do not accept), while functioning together as
members of a certain institution x. On the other hand, we need to add the principle
[Univ ]ϕ → ϕ to the logic AL. The way to embed the GMD logic into our logic AL
is illustrated in the following paragraph.
An embedding of GMD logic. Let us slightly modify the logic of acceptance AL
in order to provide a correct embedding of GMD. We call AL+ the modified logic of
acceptance.
AL+ has the same language as AL (see Section 3.1). AL+ frames are tuples F =
〈W ,A 〉 where W and A are defined as for AL frames, except that the constraints
S.1 and S.2 given in Section 3.2 are supposed to hold also for the case B 6⊆ C and
the following additional constraint S.6 is imposed. That is, for any world w ∈ W ,
institutional context x ∈ INST , and sets of agents C ,B ∈ 2AGT? we suppose:
if w ′ ∈ AB :y(w) then AC :x (w ′) ⊆ AC :x (w)(S.1’)
if w ′ ∈ AB :y(w) then AC :x (w) ⊆ AC :x (w ′)(S.2’)
Furthermore, for any world w ∈W we suppose:
∃C ∈ 2AGT?, ∃x ∈ INST such that w ∈ AC :x (w)(S.6)
The axiomatization of AL+ is given by the axiom schemes and rules of inference of
AL, except that an Axiom corresponding to the Axiom T[[Univ ]] of the GMD logic
is added, and the Axioms PAccess and NAccess of the logic AL are generalized in
such a way that they also for hold for the case B 6⊆ C. That is, for any sets of agents
C ,B ∈ 2AGT?, we suppose:
AC :xϕ→ AB :yAC :xϕ(PAccess+)
AC :xϕ→ AB :y¬AC :xϕ(NAccess+)
Furthermore, we suppose:
[Univ ]ϕ→ ϕ(TUniv )
Axioms PAccess+ and NAccess+ respectively correspond to the semantic constraints
S.1’ and S.2’, whilst Axiom TUniv corresponds to the semantic constraint S.6.
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The definitions of validity and satisfiability inAL+ are given accordingly. We write
|=AL+ ϕ if formula ϕ is valid in all AL+ models satisfying the semantic constraints
S.3, S.4, S.5 given in Section 3.2 and the constraints S.1’, S.2’, S.6 given here. We
call AL+ the logic axiomatized by Axiom TUniv and the principles of the logic AL
(Section 3.4), where Axioms PAccess and NAccess are generalized to PAccess+ and
NAccess+. We write `AL+ ϕ if formula ϕ is a theorem of AL+.
We can prove that AL+ as well is sound and complete. More precisely:
Theorem 14. `AL+ ϕ if and only if |=AL+ ϕ.
Consider the following translation tr from GMD to the new logic AL+:
• tr(⊥) = ⊥
• tr(p) = p
• tr(¬ϕ) = ¬tr(ϕ)
• tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ)
• tr([[x]]ϕ) = [x] tr(ϕ)
• tr([[Univ ]]ϕ) = [Univ ] tr(ϕ),
As the following Theorem 15 shows, tr is a correct embedding of the GMD logic.
Theorem 15. Let INST = CXT and ϕ be a formula of the GMD logic. Then, ϕ is
GMD satisfiable if and only if tr(ϕ) is AL+ satisfiable.
REMARK. It is worth noting that GMD logic can also be embedded into the variant of
AL with legislators presented in Section 7 by the translations tr([[x]]ϕ) = [x]L ϕ and
tr([[Univ ]]ϕ) = [Univ ]L ϕ, after defining
[Univ ]L ϕ
def
=
∧
x∈INST [x]
L
ϕ.
To obtain a correct embedding of the GMD logic, it is sufficient to add toAL the three
axioms [x]L ϕ → [y]L [x]L ϕ, ¬ [x]L ϕ → [y]L ¬ [x]L ϕ and [Univ ]L ϕ → ϕ and the
two corresponding semantic constraints over AL frames:
if w ′ ∈ ALeg(y):y(w) then ALeg(x):x(w ′) = ALeg(x):x(w), and
∃x ∈ INST such that w ∈ ALeg(x):x(w).
8.2 A conceptual comparison with Boella & van der Torre’s model
The formal approach to institutions and normative systems proposed by Boella & van
der Torre [Boella and van der Torre, 2004a, 2004b, 2007] is similar in some respect to
ours. Here we just provide a conceptual comparison between the two approaches. We
are not able to provide a more technical comparison. Indeed, our formalism based on
modal logic and their formalism based on input-output logic [Makinson and van der
Torre, 2000] are too different to be compared in the fashion followed in Section 8.1.
Boella & van der Torre emphasize the relevance of the concept of acceptance for a
formal model of institutions. In their model, individual agents accept a norm, together
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with its associated sanctions and rewards, when they recognize that this norm serves to
achieve their desires and believe that the other agents will conform to it. According to
them, for a norm to be really effective it must be respected due to its acceptance, and
not only to the fear of sanctions. Although they take the concept of acceptance into
consideration, they do not analyze it in detail. In particular, in their model there is no
distinction between individual acceptance and collective acceptance. On the contrary,
this distinction is fundamental in our AL logic in which we clarify the relationships
between individual acceptances and collective acceptances and we provide an explana-
tion of how the collective acceptance of a group of agents C is built from the individual
acceptances of the agents in C .
Moreover, in Boella & van der Torre’s approach, normative systems and institutions
are conceived as agents and mental attitudes such as beliefs and goals are ascribed to
them. Differently from them, we do not claim that institutions can be conceived as
agents. In our approach, we only defend the idea that the institutional reality is built on
the top of the agents’ attitudes. In particular, we claim that institutions are grounded
on the individual and collective acceptances of their members and groups of members,
and their dynamics depend on the dynamics of these acceptances.
9 Conclusion
We have presented in this article a logic of acceptance and applied it to the analysis of
institutions. Our logic of acceptance allows to express that agents accept something to
be true qua members of a certain institution. Given the properties of this demystified
notion of acceptance, we have provided an analysis of the kind of attitude-dependent
facts which are typical of institutions. We have formalized the concept of constitutive
rule expressed by statements of the form “X counts as Y in the context of institution
x”. Then, we have introduced a notion of obligation and a notion permission with
respect to an institutional context (i.e. so-called regulative rules). While constitutive
rules and regulative rules are usually defined from the external perspective of a nor-
mative system or institution, in the present work we have anchored these rules in the
agents’ acceptances.
Directions for future research are manifold. For instance, future works will be
devoted to integrate modalities expressing agents’ goals and preferences, such as the
ones provided in [Cohen and Levesque, 1990], into the logical framework presented
in this paper. This is in order to investigate the decision to join (resp. not to join)
a given institution and the related decision to accept (resp. not to accept) the norms
of the institution with its associated sanctions and rewards. These kinds of decisions
are indeed influenced by the inconsistency between the agent’s goals and the current
norms and rules of the institution. For instance, if the agent’s goals conflict with the
norms proclaimed by the legislators then, the agent will probably decide not to join the
institution.
Another interesting topic to be investigated in future works is the dynamics of in-
dividual and collective acceptances in institutional contexts. We have already started
to study this topic in a recent work [Herzig et al., 2008]. The idea is to extend the
logic of acceptance AL by events of type x !ϕ and corresponding dynamic operators
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of the form [x !ϕ]. A formula [x !ϕ]ψ, means that ψ is true after every announcement
of formula ϕ in the context of institution x . Operators of type [x !ϕ], which are simi-
lar to the operators of announcements in dynamic epistemic logic [Baltag et al., 1998,
Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997, van Ditmarsch et al., 2007], express that the mem-
bers of an institution x learn that ϕ is true in that institution in such a way that their
acceptances, qua members of institution x, are updated. Such operators can also be
used to describe how the acceptances of the members of institution x change, after that
a certain norm (e.g. obligation, permission) is issued or promulgated within the context
of this institution.
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A Annex: proofs of some theorems
This Annex contains some selected proofs of the theorems presented in the paper.
Proof of Theorem 1
Axiom K and rule of inference Nec define a minimal normal modal logic. Thus, they
do not have an associated semantic constraint. It is a routine task to check that the Ax-
ioms PAccess, NAccess, Inc, Unanim and Mon of the logic AL correspond to their
semantic counterparts S.1-S.5 overAL models. In particular, the following correspon-
dences exist between the axioms of the logicAL and the semantic constraints overAL
frames.
• Axioms PAccess corresponds to the constraint S.1.
• Axiom NAccess corresponds to the constraint S.2.
• Axiom Inc corresponds to the constraint S.3.
• Axiom Unanim corresponds to the constraint S.4.
• Axiom Mon corresponds to the constraint S.5.
It is a routine, too, to check that all of axioms of the logicAL are in the Sahlqvist class,
for which a general completeness result exists.
(See [Sahlqvist, 1975, Blackburn et al., 2001].)
Proof of Theorem 2
For notational convenience, we will use the following abbreviation in the proof:
ÂC :xϕ def= ¬AC :x¬ϕ
We have to prove that if ϕ is AL satisfiable then it is satisfiable in a finite AL
model.
Suppose that M = 〈W ,A ,V 〉 is a AL model which satisfies ϕ. Our aim is
to build a finite AL model which satisfies ϕ. To do this, we use a filtration method
[Blackburn et al., 2001, Goldblatt, 1992].
Let us introduce the following definition.
Definition 1. A set of formulas Σ is closed under subformulas (cus) if for all formulas
ϕ,ϕ′: if ϕ ∨ ϕ′ ∈ Σ then so are ϕ and ϕ′; if ¬ϕ′ ∈ Σ then so is ϕ; for any x ∈ INST
and C ∈ 2AGT? if AC :xϕ ∈ Σ then ϕ ∈ Σ.
Let us now consider an arbitrary finite set of formulas Σϕ which is closed under
subformulas and which contains ϕ. From Σϕ we define the set Σ+ϕ as follows.
Σ+ϕ is defined as the smallest superset of Σϕ such that:
1. for all x, y ∈ INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT?, if AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ then AB :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ ;
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2. for all x ∈ INST and C ∈ 2AGT?, if AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ then ¬AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ ;
3. for all x ∈ INST and C ∈ 2AGT?, AC :x⊥ ∈ Σ+ϕ ;
4. ⊥ ∈ Σ+ϕ .
The following proposition follows straightforwardly due to the fact that the sets AGT
and INST are supposed to be finite.
Proposition 3. Σ+ϕ is finite and closed under subformulas.
We define the relation! between the worlds in W of the modelM. For every
two worlds w, v ∈W :
• w! v iff for all ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ ,M, w |= ϕ iffM, v |= ϕ.
For every world w ∈ W , we note |w| the equivalence class of world w of M with
respect to!. Moreover, let WΣ+ϕ = {|w| | w ∈W }.
Now, we have to build a filtrated modelMf = 〈W f ,A f ,V f 〉 of the modelM.
Definition 2. We defineMf as follows.
A. W f = WΣ+ϕ ;
B. for every B ∈ 2AGT? and x ∈ INST , |v| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) if and only if:
1. ∀AB :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AB :xϕ thenM, v |= ϕ;
2. ∀y ∈ INST and ∀C ∈ 2AGT?, if B ⊆ C then:
∀AC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AC :yϕ thenM, v |= AC :yϕ;
3. ∀y ∈ INST and ∀C ∈ 2AGT?, if B ⊆ C then:
∀ÂC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂC :yϕ thenM, v |= ÂC :yϕ;
4. ∀C ∈ 2AGT?, if B ⊆ C then:
∀AC :xϕ, ÂC :x> ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂC :x> ∧AC :xϕ thenM, v |= ϕ;
5. ∃i ∈ B such that ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, v |= Ai:xϕ thenM, v |= ϕ.
C. V f (p) = {|w| | M, w |= p}, for all propositional atoms in Σ+ϕ .
It is straightforward to prove that the modelMf is indeed a filtration ofM through
Σ+ϕ .
Lemma 1. Mf is a filtration ofM through Σ+ϕ .
The next step consists in proving thatMf is a AL model.
Lemma 2. Mf is a AL model.
Proof. We have to prove that the model Mf satisfies the five semantic constraints
S.1-S.5 over AL models.
Let us start with constraint S.1. We have to prove that the following condition holds
inMf for any x, y ∈ INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
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• if |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w′|) then |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|).
Suppose |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|), where B ⊆ C . We have to prove
that |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|). By Definition 2, the latter is equivalent to:
1. ∀AC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AC :yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ;
2. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AD:zϕ thenM, w′′ |= AD:zϕ;
3. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂD:zϕ thenM, w′′ |= ÂD:zϕ;
4. ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:yϕ, ÂD:y> ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂD:y> ∧AD:yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ;
5. ∃i ∈ C such that ∀Ai:yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′′ |= Ai:yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ.
So, to prove S.1 we just need to prove that the previous items 1-5 are consequences of
|w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w′|) when B ⊆ C .
Item 1. Suppose AC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ and M, w |= AC :yϕ. As B ⊆ C and |w′| ∈
A fB :x (|w|), it follows thatM, w′′ |= ϕ.
Item 2. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As
B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D . Suppose AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= AD:zϕ. As |w′| ∈
A fB :x (|w|), it follows thatM, w′ |= AD:zϕ. As w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|), we conclude that
M, w′′ |= AD:zϕ.
Item 3. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As
B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D . Suppose ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= ÂD:zϕ. As |w′| ∈
A fB :x (|w|), it follows thatM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ. As w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|), we conclude that
M, w′′ |= ÂD:zϕ.
Item 4. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D . As B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D .
Suppose AD:yϕ, ÂD:y> ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= AD:yϕ ∧ ÂD:y>. As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|),
it follows that M, w′ |= AD:yϕ ∧ ÂD:y>. As w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|), we conclude that
M, w′′ |= ϕ.
Item 5. This item follows straightforwardly from the fact w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|).
This proves that S.1 holds.
Let us now consider constraint S.2. We have to prove that the following condition
holds inMf for any x, y ∈ INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
• if |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w|) then w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w′|).
Suppose |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w|), where B ⊆ C . We have to prove
that |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w′|). By Definition 2, the latter is equivalent to:
1. ∀AC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= AC :yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ;
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2. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= AD:zϕ thenM, w′′ |= AD:zϕ;
3. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ thenM, w′′ |= ÂD:zϕ;
4. ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:yϕ, ÂD:y> ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= ÂD:y> ∧AD:yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ;
5. ∃i ∈ C such that ∀Ai:yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′′ |= Ai:yϕ thenM, w′′ |= ϕ.
So, to prove S.2 we just need to prove that items 1-5 are consequences of |w′| ∈
A fB :x (|w|) and w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w|).
Item 1. Suppose AC :yϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ and M, w′ |= AC :yϕ. By construction of Σ+ϕ
we have ÂC :y¬ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ . As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and B ⊆ C, it follows thatM, w |=
AC :yϕ. As |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|), we conclude thatM, w′′ |= ϕ.
Item 2. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As B ⊆
C , we have B ⊆ D . Suppose AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w′ |= AD:zϕ. By construction
of Σ+ϕ we have ÂD:z¬ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ . As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and B ⊆ D , it follows that
M, w |= AD:zϕ. As |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|), we conclude thatM, w′′ |= AD:zϕ.
Item 3. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As B ⊆
C , we have B ⊆ D . Suppose ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ. By construction
of Σ+ϕ we have AD:z¬ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ . As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and C ⊆ D , it follows that
M, w |= ÂD:zϕ. As |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|), we conclude thatM, w′′ |= ÂD:zϕ.
Item 4. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D . As B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D .
Suppose AD:yϕ, ÂD:y> ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w′ |= AD:yϕ ∧ ÂD:y>. By construction of
Σ+ϕ we haveAD:y⊥, ÂD:y¬ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ . As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and C ⊆ D , it follows that
M, w |= AD:yϕ ∧ ÂD:y>. As |w′′| ∈ A fC :y(|w|), we conclude thatM, w′′ |= ϕ.
Item 5. This item follows straightforwardly from the fact w′′ ∈ A fC :y(|w|).
This proves that S.2 holds.
As a next step we have to prove the modelMf satisfies the semantic condition S.3.
That is, we have to prove that for any x ∈ INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
• if A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ then A fB :x (|w|) ⊆ A fC :x (|w|).
The following proposition is needed to prove thatMf satisfies the condition S.3.
Proposition 4. For every x ∈ INST and C ∈ 2AGT?, if A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ then ∃w ∈
|w| such thatM, w |= ÂC :x>.
Proof. Let us suppose that A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅, andM, w |= AC :x⊥ for all w ∈ |w|. We
are going to show that the two facts are inconsistent.
Condition A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ implies that ∃|w′| ∈ W f such that: if AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ
then, ifM, w |= AC :xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ. As we haveAC :x⊥ ∈ Σ+ϕ (by construction
of Σ+ϕ ) and we have supposedM, w |= AC :x⊥, we can infer thatM, w′ |= ⊥.
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Let us now prove that Mf satisfies the condition S.3. Consider an arbitrary x ∈
INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C . Suppose that A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ and
w′ ∈ A fB :x (|w|). We have to prove that w′ ∈ A fC :x (|w|). By Definition 2, the latter is
equivalent to:
1. ∀AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AC :xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ;
2. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AD:zϕ thenM, w′ |= AD:zϕ;
3. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂD:zϕ thenM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ;
4. ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if C ⊆ D then:
∀AD:xϕ, ÂD:x> ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= ÂD:x> ∧AD:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ;
5. ∃i ∈ C such that ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ.
So, to prove thatMf satisfies the condition S.3 we just need to prove that items 1-5
are consequences of A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ and |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|).
Item 1. Suppose AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ and M, w |= AC :xϕ. By construction of Σ+ϕ ,
we have ÂC :x> ∈ Σ+ϕ . From A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ it follows that ∃w ∈ |w| such that
M, w |= ÂC :x> (by Proposition 4). Thus, by definition of |w|, we can conclude that
∀w ∈ |w| it holds that M, w |= ÂC :x>. Then, in particular, M, w |= ÂC :x>. As
M, w |= AC :xϕ andB ⊆ C, from the latter it follows thatM, w |= AB :xϕ (by Axiom
Inc of the logic AL). As |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|) and AB :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ (from AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , by
construction of Σ+ϕ ), from the latter we concludeM, w′ |= ϕ.
Item 2. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As
B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D . Moreover, suppose AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= AD:zϕ. As
|w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|), we conclude thatM, w′ |= AD:zϕ.
Item 3. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D and an arbitrary z ∈ INST . As
B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D . Moreover, suppose ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= ÂD:zϕ. As
|w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|), we conclude thatM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ.
Item 4. Take an arbitrary D such that C ⊆ D . As B ⊆ C , we have B ⊆ D .
Moreover, suppose AD:xϕ, ÂD:x> ∈ Σ+ϕ andM, w |= AD:xϕ ∧ ÂD:x>. As |w′| ∈
A fB :x (|w|), we conclude thatM, w′ |= ϕ.
Item 5. From w′ ∈ A fB :x (|w|), it follows that ∃i ∈ B such that ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , if
M, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ. As B ⊆ C , the latter implies that ∃i ∈ C such that
∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ.
This proves that S.3 holds.
Now, we prove that the modelMf satisfies the semantic condition S.4. That is, we
prove that for any x ∈ INST and C ∈ 2AGT?:
• if |w′| ∈ A fC :x (|w|) then |w′| ∈
⋃
i∈C Ai:x (|w′|).
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Suppose |w′| ∈ A fC :x (|w|). We have to prove that |w′| ∈
⋃
i∈C Ai:x (|w′|). By
Definition 2, the latter is equivalent to the fact that ∃i ∈ C such that:
1. ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ;
2. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if i ∈ D then:
∀AD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= AD:zϕ thenM, w′ |= AD:zϕ;
3. ∀z ∈ INST and ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if i ∈ D then:
∀ÂD:zϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ thenM, w′ |= ÂD:zϕ;
4. ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if i ∈ D then:
∀AD:xϕ, ÂD:x> ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= ÂD:x> ∧AD:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ;
5. ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ.
Thus, we have to suppose |w′| ∈ A fC :x (|w|) and prove that ∃i ∈ C which satisfies
items 1-5. Items 2 and 3 trivially hold for all ∃i ∈ C . Moreover, items 1 and 5 are the
same condition. Therefore, we just need to prove that |w′| ∈ A fC :x (|w|) implies that
∃i ∈ C which satisfies items 1 and 4.
From |w′| ∈ A fC :x (|w|), we can infer that ∃i ∈ C such that ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , if
M, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ.
By Axiom Inc of the logic AL and by construction of Σ+ϕ the following property
holds for all i ∈ C . For all D ∈ 2AGT?, if i ∈ D then: ∀AD:xϕ, ÂD:x> ∈ Σ+ϕ , if
M, w′ |= ÂD:x> ∧AD:xϕ thenM, w′ |= Ai:xϕ and Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ .
From the previous two facts, we conclude that ∃i ∈ C such that: ∀Ai:xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , if
M, w′ |= Ai:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ; ∀D ∈ 2AGT?, if i ∈ D then: ∀AD:xϕ, ÂD:x> ∈
Σ+ϕ , ifM, w′ |= ÂD:x> ∧AD:xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ.
This proves that S.4 holds.
It remains to be proved that the model Mf satisfies the semantic condition S.5.
That is, we have to prove that for any x ∈ INST and C ,B ∈ 2AGT? such that B ⊆ C :
• if A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ then A fB :x (|w|) 6= ∅.
In order to prove this, we prove first that A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ implies M, w |= ÂB :x>,
when B ⊆ C .
Let us suppose that A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ andM, w |= AB :x⊥ with B ⊆ C . We show
that these facts are inconsistent.
FromM, w |= AB :x⊥ we inferM, w |= AC :x⊥ (by Axiom Mon of the logicAL
and the fact that B ⊆ C ). From Definition 2 and A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅, we can infer that
∃|w′| such that ∀AC :xϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ , ifM, w |= AC :xϕ thenM, w′ |= ϕ. By construction
of Σ+ϕ we have that AC :x⊥ ∈ Σ+ϕ . Thus, as we haveM, w |= AC :x⊥, we conclude
that ∃|w′| such thatM, w′ |= ⊥.
This proves that A fC :x (|w|) 6= ∅ impliesM, w |= ÂB :x>, when B ⊆ C .
Now, we have to show thatM, w |= ÂB :x> implies A fB :x (|w|) 6= ∅.
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M, w |= ÂB :x> implies that ∃w′ such that w′ ∈ AB :x (w). AsMf is a filtration
ofM (Lemma 1), from the latter we conclude that ∃|w′| such that |w′| ∈ A fB :x (|w|).
This proves that S.5 holds.
Lemma 3. The modelMf contains at most 2n worlds where n denotes the size of Σ+ϕ .
Proof. From Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.38 given in [Blackburn et al., 2001, p. 79].
Lemma 4. Mf is a finite model.
Proof. From Lemma 3 and Proposition 3.
Lemma 5. Formula ϕ is satisfiable inMf .
Proof. From Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, the fact that ϕ is satisfiable inM, the fact
that ϕ ∈ Σ+ϕ and the Filtration Theorem given in [Blackburn et al., 2001, p. 79].
Lemma 6. The logic AL has the finite model property.
Proof. We have started with an arbitrary formula ϕ which is satisfiable in a AL model
M. We have built a modelMf and proved thatMf is a finite AL model (Lemma 4).
Finally, we have proved that ϕ is satisfiable inMf (Lemma 5). Thus, we can conclude
that for every formula ϕ, if ϕ is AL satisfiable then, ϕ is satisfiable in a finite AL
model.
Theorem 2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 6.
Proof of Theorem 14
As for the logic AL, it is a routine to prove soundness, whereas completeness is
again obtained by Sahlqvist completeness theorem. Indeed, all axioms of AL+ are
in the Sahlqvist class, for which a general completeness result exists [Sahlqvist, 1975,
Blackburn et al., 2001].
Proof of Theorem 15
In order to prove Theorem 15, it is sufficient to prove that if INST = CXT and ϕ is
a formula of the GMD logic then: if ϕ is a theorem of GMD then tr(ϕ) is a theorem
of AL+ and, if ϕ is GMD satisfiable then tr(ϕ) is AL+ satisfiable.
Proposition 5. Suppose that INST = CXT and ϕ is a formula of the logic GMD
then: if `GMD ϕ then `AL+ tr(ϕ).
Proof. We only need to prove that the translations of the axioms of the GMD logic are
theorems ofAL+ and that the translated rules of inference of GMD preserves validity.
It is straightforward to show that the translation of the rules of inference Nec[[x]],
Nec[[Univ ]] and MP preserve validity. As theAL+ operators [x] and [Univ ] are normal,
it is a routine to verify that the translation of the GMD Axioms K[[x]] and K[[Univ ]] are
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theorems ofAL+. Furthermore, by the definitions of [x]ϕ and [Univ ]ϕ, it is just trivial
to prove that that the translation of the GMD Axiom⊆[[Univ ]],[[x]] is a theorem ofAL+.
The translation of the GMD Axiom T[[Univ ]] is a theorem of AL+ as well. Indeed,
this corresponds to the Axiom TUniv of the logic AL+. By Axioms PAccess+ and
NAccess+ we can prove that the translations of the GMD Axioms 4[[x]],[[y]] and 5[[x]],[[y]]
are theorems ofAL+. By the same principles, we can prove that the translations of the
GMD Axioms 4[[Univ ]] and 5[[Univ ]] are theorems of AL+.
Proposition 6. Suppose that INST = CXT and ϕ is a formula of the logic GMD
then: if ϕ is GMD satisfiable then tr(ϕ) is AL+ satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose thatϕ is GMD satisfiable. Thus, there exists a GMDmodelMGMD =
〈S , {Sx}x∈CXT0 , pi〉 which satisfies ϕ. We prove that we can build a AL+ modelM
which satisfies the same formulas asMGMD.
As we have supposed INST = CXT , the AL+ model M associated with the
GMD modelMGMD can be defined as follows.
• W = S ;
• ∀w ∈W ,∀x ∈ CXT 0,∀C ∈ 2AGT?, AC :x (w) = Sx;
• ∀w ∈W ,∀C ∈ 2AGT?, AC :Univ (w) = S ;
• ∀w ∈W ,∀p ∈ ATM,w ∈ pi(p) if and only if w ∈ V (p).
It is a routine to verify that the previous conditions ensure that the modelM is indeed a
AL+ model. By structural induction on ϕ, it is also a routine to prove that the previous
AL+ model satisfies the same formulas as the GMD model it is associated. That is,
MGMD, w |= ϕ if and only ifM, w |= tr(ϕ).
Theorem 15 is an immediate corollary of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6.
Proof of Theorems 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7
Theorems 3 and 4 can be syntactically proved usingAL logic axiomatization. Theorem
5 proof is based on Theorem 3. As every AC:x operator is normal, Theorems 6 and 7
can be proved by iteration of the Axiom (K) and the Rule of Necessitation (Nec) for
every group of 2AGT? and every institution of INST . We provide in the sequel only
the complete proof for Theorems (3a) and (3e).
Proof. Theorem (3a):
(1) `AL AC :x⊥ ∨ ¬AC :x⊥, by (ProTau)
(2) `AL ¬AC :x⊥ → AC :x¬AC :x⊥, by (NAccess)
(3) `AL AC :x⊥ → AC :x¬AC :x⊥, by (ProTau), (Nec) and (K)
(4) `AL AC :x¬AC :x⊥, from (1), (2) and (3) by (ProTau)
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Proof. Theorem (3e):
(1) `AL AC :x ((¬AC :x⊥∧AC :xϕ)→ Ai:xϕ), for every i ∈ C, from Axiom (Inc)
by inference rule (Nec),
(2) `AL AC :x ((¬AC :x⊥ ∧AC :xϕ)→
∧
i∈C Ai:xϕ), from (1), by K principles
(3) `AL AC :x (
∧
i∈C Ai:xϕ→ ϕ), from (Unanim)
(4) `AL AC :x ((¬AC :x⊥ ∧AC :xϕ)→ ϕ), from (2) and (3) by (ProTau) and (K)
(5) `AL AC :x¬AC :x⊥ → AC :x (AC :xϕ→ ϕ), from (4) by (ProTau) and (K)
(6) `AL ¬AC :x⊥ → AC :x¬AC :x⊥, by (NAccess)
(7) `AL ¬AC :x⊥ → AC :x (AC :xϕ→ ϕ), from (5) and (6) by (ProTau)
(8) `AL AC :x⊥ → AC :x (AC :xϕ→ ϕ), by (ProTau), (Nec) and (K)
(9) `AL AC :x (AC :xϕ→ ϕ), from (7) and (8) by (ProTau)
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let suppose that the majority Principle (Majority) holds for any sets of agents
C and B such that B ⊆ C and |C \ B| < |B |. We will prove by induction on the set
Cn, that there exists a set Cn such that:
(¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ)→ ACn:xϕ(Pn)
where i, j ∈ AGT , Cn ⊆ AGT , |Cn| = n and n ≥ 2.
We begin by showing that (P2) holds.
(1) `AL ¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ→ A{i,j}:xA{i,j}:xϕ, by (Inc).
(2) `AL ¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ→ A{i,j}:xϕ, from (1) by Theorem (3c)
(2) entails that (P2) holds.
We suppose that (Pn) holds for any n such that Cn ⊂ AGT . Under this hypothesis
we will show that (Pn+1) holds. We suppose thatCn+1 is defined as: Cn+1 = Cn∪{i},
with i ∈ AGT and i 6∈ Cn (thus Cn ⊂ Cn+1).
(3) `AL (¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧ AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ) → ACn:xϕ, by induction hypothesis
(Pn)
(4) `AL (ACn+1:x¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧ ACn+1:xAAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ) → ACn+1:xACn:xϕ,
from (3) by (Nec), (K) and standard properties of normal modal operatorACn+1:x
(5) `AL (¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧ AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ) → ACn+1:xACn:xϕ ∧ ¬ACn+1:x⊥,
from (4) by (PAccess), (NAccess), (Mon) and (ProTau)
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(6) `AL ¬ACn+1:x⊥ → ¬ACn:x⊥, by (Mon)
(7) `AL ACn+1:x¬ACn+1:x⊥ → ACn+1:x¬ACn:x⊥, from (6) by (Nec), (K)
(8) `AL ¬ACn+1:x⊥ → ACn+1:x¬ACn:x⊥, from (7) by (NAccess) and (ProTau)
(9) `AL (¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧ AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ) → ACn+1:x(ACn:xϕ ∧ ¬ACn:x⊥),
from (5) and (8) by (ProTau) and standard properties of normal modal operator
ACn+1:x
(10) `AL (¬AAGT :x⊥ ∧ AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ) → ACn+1:x(
∧
k∈Cn Ak :xϕ), from (9)
by (Inc), (K), (Nec) and (ProTau)
(11) `AL (¬AAGT :x⊥∧AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ)→ ACn+1:xϕ, from (10) by (Majority),
(K), (Nec) and (ProTau)
Thus (11) entails (Pn+1).
As (P2) holds and from (Pn) we can infer that (Pn+1) for n < |AGT |, we can thus
deduce by induction that (Pn) holds for n ≤ |AGT |. In particular, we can deduce from
the extension of the Principles (Majority) for every set of agents C and B such that
B ⊆ C and |C \B| < |B |, that the following counterintuitive formula holds:
(AAGT :xA{i,j}:xϕ ∧ ¬AAGT :x⊥)→ AAGT :xϕ
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 7.
AC :xϕ↔ Bel iAC :xϕ if i ∈ C(7a)
¬AC :xϕ↔ Bel i¬AC :xϕ if i ∈ C(7b)
Proof. Lemma (7a) and (7b):
(1) ¬AC :xϕ→ Bel i¬AC :xϕ, by (NegIntrAccept), for i ∈ C
(2) Bel i¬AC :xϕ→ ¬Bel iAC :xϕ, by Axiom (D) for Bel i
(3) Bel iAC :xϕ→ AC :xϕ, from (1), (2), and (ProTau), for i ∈ C
The proof of Lemma (7b) is similar to the one of Lemma (7a), we only use Axiom
(PIntrAccept) instead of Axiom (NegIntrAccept).
Proof. Propositions (2a) and (2b):
(1) MBCAC :xϕ→
∧
i∈C Bel i(AC :xϕ ∧MBCAC :xϕ), by (FixPoint)
(2)
∧
i∈C Bel i(AC :xϕ∧MBCAC :xϕ)→
∧
i∈C Bel iAC :xϕ, because Bel i are nor-
mal modal operators
(3)
∧
i∈C Bel iAC :xϕ→ AC :xϕ, by Lemma (7a)
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(4) MBCAC :xϕ→ AC :xϕ, from (1), (2), (3) by (ProTau)
(5) AC :xϕ→ Bel iAC :xϕ, by (PIntrAccept), for every i ∈ C
(6) AC :xϕ→ EC(AC :xϕ ∧ AC :xϕ), from (5), by (ProTau) and definition of EC
(7) AC :xϕ → MBCAC :xϕ, from (6) by inference rule (InductionRule) (left to
right direction of Theorem (2a))
(8) AC :xϕ↔MBCAC :xϕ, from (4) and (7)
The proof of Proposition (2b) is similar to the one of Proposition (2a), we only use
Lemma (7b) instead of Lemma (7a) and (NegIntrAccept) instead of (PIntrAccept).
Proof of Theorem 8
To prove that these formulas are not valid in AL, we only have to exhibit a model
where there is a world where these formulas are false. We give the complete proof only
for Theorem (8b), the others are very similar.
Proof. Theorem (8b):
We will build aALmodelM in which there is a world w is which the formula is false,
i.e.: M, w  (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2
x
B ϕ3) ∧ ¬(ϕ1
x
B ϕ3). Let ATM = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3},
AGT = {i}, INST = {x, y, z} and W = {w ,wx,wy,wz}. We build the valuation
function V : V (ϕ1) = {wy}, V (ϕ2) = {wz} and V (ϕ3) = {wy}, and the relation A :
A{i}:x(w) = {wx}, A{i}:y(w) = {wy} and A{i}:z(w) = {wz}.
As we wantM to be aALmodel, we ensure that it satisfies the constraints S.1-S.5.
• In order to satisfy (S.1) and (S.2) we impose: 〈wy,wx〉 ∈ A{i}:x, 〈wz,wx〉 ∈
A{i}:x, 〈wx,wy〉 ∈ A{i}:y , 〈wz,wy〉 ∈ A{i}:y , 〈wx,wz〉 ∈ A{i}:z and 〈wy,wz〉 ∈
A{i}:z;
• as there is only one agent in our model, (S.3) and (S.5) are satisfied;
• in order to satisfy (S.4) we impose that: 〈wx,wx〉 ∈ A{i}:x, 〈wy,wy〉 ∈ A{i}:y
and 〈wz,wz〉 ∈ A{i}:z;
In this modelM:
• M,w  [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ [x] (ϕ2 → ϕ3)
• M,w  ¬ [y] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) and thusM,w  ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ2)
• M,w  ¬ [z] (ϕ2 → ϕ3) and thusM,w  ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ2 → ϕ3)
• M,w  [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3) ∧ [y] (ϕ1 → ϕ3) ∧ [z] (ϕ1 → ϕ3), i.e. M,w 
[Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)
We have built aALmodel which satisfies the formula (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)∧(ϕ2
x
B ϕ3)∧¬(ϕ1
x
B
ϕ3). Thus, (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2
x
B ϕ3)→ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3) is not valid in AL. By Theorem 1,
we conclude that (ϕ1
x
B ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2
x
B ϕ3)→ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3) is not a theorem of AL.
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Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. Theorems (9a) and (9b):
Since [x] and [Univ ] are normal modal operators, they satisfy the rule of equivalence
RE [Chellas, 1980]. Theorems (9a) and (9b) follow straightforwardly from RE.
Proof. Theorem (9c):
(1) `AL ((ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1 → ϕ3))↔ (ϕ1 → (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)), by (ProTau)
(2) `AL ([x] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)) → [x] (ϕ1 → (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)), from (1) by
Theorem (6b)
(3) `AL (¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)) → (¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∨
¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)), by (ProTau)
(4) `AL (¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∨ ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)) → ¬ [Univ ] ((ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧
(ϕ1 → ϕ3)), by standard properties of normal modal operator [Univ ]
(5) `AL (¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → ϕ3)) → ¬ [Univ ] (ϕ1 → (ϕ2 ∧
ϕ3)), from (3) and (4) by (ProTau)
(6) ((ϕ1
x
B ϕ2)∧ (ϕ1
x
B ϕ3))→ (ϕ1
x
B (ϕ2 ∧ ϕ3)), from (2) and (5) and (ProTau)
Proof. Theorems (9d) and (9e):
The proofs of Theorems (9d) and (9e) are very similar to the previous one. Both apply
(Nec), (K) and propositional tautologies.
Proof of Theorem 10
All these theorems follow from the necessitation rule (Nec) and logical tautologies.
Proofs also need Axiom (K) and theorems (M) and (C)10 [Chellas, 1980] for the distri-
bution over conjunction. We give the complete proof of Theorem (10b) as an example.
Proof. Theorem (10b):
(1) `AL ((ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ3))→ (ϕ1 → ϕ3), by (ProTau)
(2) `AL [x] (((ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ3))→ (ϕ1 → ϕ3)), from (1) by (Nec)
(3) `AL [x] ((ϕ1 → ϕ2)∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ3))→ [x] (ϕ1 → ϕ3), from (2) by (K) and (C).
10The conjunction of both (M) and (C) give the equivalence: [x] (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)↔ ([x]ϕ1 ∧ [x]ϕ2).
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Proof of Theorem 11
Proof. Theorem (11a):
This theorem comes straightforwardly from Theorems 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, and the fol-
lowing propositional tautologies:
(1) `AL (((ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)→ viol) ∧ (¬ϕ→ viol))→ (¬ψ → viol), by (ProTau)
(2) `AL (¬ψ → viol)→ ((¬ψ ∧ ϕ)→ viol), by (ProTau)
Proof. Theorem (11b):
(1) `AL Ox> → ¬ [Univ ] (⊥ → viol), by the definition of Ox>
(2) `AL ¬ [Univ ] (⊥ → viol)→ ¬ [Univ ]>, by (ProTau)
(3) `AL ¬ [Univ ]> → ⊥, by standard properties of normal modal operator [Univ ]
(4) `AL > → ¬Ox>, from (1), (2) and (3) by (ProTau)
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